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SCHOOL CHOICE: AMERICAN
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION ENTER THE "ADAPT OR DIE"
ENVIRONMENT OF A COMPETITIVE
MARKETPLACE
JONATHAN

B.

CLEVELAND*

"[Olne of the first rules of government is when you know you are
doing something stupid, stop doing it."1
"The definition of insanity is doing the same thing day after day,
while each day expecting different results.'
INTRODUCTION

The performance of American elementary and secondary
students has declined rapidly over the last thirty years, while the
cost of educating those students has risen dramatically.3 Setting
aside whether or not standardized tests appropriately measure
academic performance, American students compare miserably
against international students on tests of math and science proficiency.4 No one can ignore the implications that arise from an
education system that has made us a Nation at Risk. 5 The competitiveness of an industrial economy depends on the education
level of its labor. American business suffers unnecessary costs by
providing its labor with basic education that secondary schools
should have provided, and incurs the unknown cost from Ameri-

* B.S., University of Southern California (1990); J.D., University of Minnesota
Law School (1995); Currently Attorney at Mayer, Brown & Platt in Chicago. Published: Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company v. Clarke: A Second Look at National Bank Annuity Sales and 12 U.S.C. § 92, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 911 (1994).
1. Pierre S. duPont IV, A "GI Bill" for Educating All Children, reprinted in
PRIVATIZING EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES 134 (Simon Hakim et al. eds., 1994).
2. James A. Peyser, School Choice: When, Not If, 35 B.C. L. REV. 619, 627

(1994).

3. Id. at 626.
4. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the decline
of the academic performance of American students compared to students in other
countries
5. See generally THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A
NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983).
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can labor's relatively lesser ability to think on the job.' The deterioration of the American elementary and secondary education
system thus foreshadows future declines in American industrial
competitiveness. America can expect industries to relocate certain
labor intensive manufacturing processes to locations such as Poland or Southeast Asia, that offer low cost and better educated
labor.'
The deterioration in American education has
disproportionately occurred in the inner-city.8 In fact, inner-city
public schools serving the poor more closely resemble prisons
rather than places of learning. Because education is directly
linked to economic prosperity, the failure to adequately educate
children of the inner-city perpetuates a cycle of poverty in America.9 Despite dedicating substantial resources to inner-city public
schools, these declines continue.' °
Education reform is a critical issue facing state and federal
level policy-makers. Ignoring the reality that public funds are a
scarce resource, the education establishment, generally teacher
unions, administrators and their organized groups and other education bureaucrats and their organized groups, advocate that
government has underfunded education, and that the public
school system needs more money to solve the problem. On the
contrary, the government has not underfunded lower-level education. In fact, inflation-adjusted expenditures per pupil have increased more than 400% over the past forty years." Moreover,
America spends more per student on education than virtually all
other industrial countries.' 2 Yet, our students consistently

6. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
an uneducated labor force on American businesses.
7. Peter Gumbel, Exporting Labor: Western Europe Finds That It's Pricing Itself Out of the Job Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1993, at Al (discussing the migration of Western European labor-intensive manufacturing to low cost manufacturing
facilities in Poland and other Eastern European countries); Steven E. Levingston,
Manufacturing Surge Shifts to the Southeast, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1991, at Al
(discussing the shifting of low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing from Hong
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea to Southeast Asia).
8. See Amy J. Schmitz, Providing an Escape for Inner-City Children: Creating
a Federal Remedy for EducationalIlls of Poor Urban Schools, 78 MINN. L. REV.
1639, 1641-47 (1994).
9. See generally Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Education for All Maryland's Children:Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD. L. REV. 1137 (1993).
10. See infra notes 97-114, 590-603 and accompanying text discussing how substantial amounts of increased education funds are allocated to bureaucracy and administration and not to the education of children.
11. JAMES R. RINEHART & JACKSON F. LEE, JR., AMERICAN EDUCATION AND THE
DYNAMICS OF CHOICE 7 (1991).

12. See infra note 59 and accompanying text for figures on United States spending on education.
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underperform students of those countries."l
Cynically, the education establishment of course wants more
money because they would benefit most from increased expenditures. For example, at least thirty-three cents, and in some cases
fifty cents, of every additional educational dollar funds non-educational activities such as administration. 4 Of the money directed
toward "instructional expenditures," evidence suggests that the
system directs resources in areas that have no positive relationship to improving academic performance."5 Furthermore, merely
focusing on funding ignores the systemic problems that exist in
American education. The system today stifles innovation and
individual effort, is subject to political constraints that dictate
"milquetoast" curricula and is plagued with the complacency that
inherently exists whenever institutions are not subject to competition. 16

This Article challenges the present system of delivering education in grades K-12. It concludes that the present educational
system is primarily responsible for the deterioration in the academic performance of American students and leads to a tremendous waste of social resources. In the present framework, America
educates approximately ninety percent of its children in a public
school monopoly. I' The public school monopoly exists as a result
of producer subsidies that allow the predation of competing private schools.'" This government operated monopoly has become a
bureaucratic, hierarchical, rule-bound provider that wastes social
resources. In addition, this system directly contravenes numerous
studies that indicate that education provided through a decentralized system, with parents, teachers and principals operating autonomously to determine curriculum, personnel and other matters,
leads to substantially better performance by students. 9
The American public school system delivers its product (i.e.,
education) to the market (i.e., students and parents) under the
same principles that the former Soviet Union state enterprises
13. See infra note 430 and accompanying text comparing the performance of
American students against students from other countries that spend less per student on education.
14. See infra notes 588-601 and accompanying text discussing increased educational costs related to implementation of tasks and policies externally imposed on
public educators.
15. Id.
16. Peyser, supra note 2, at 624.
17. Id. at 622 n.13.
18. Philip K Porter & Michael L. Davis, The Value of Private Property in Education: Innovation, Production, and Employment, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 397,
412-13 (1991).
19. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text discussing autonomous and
decentralized school systems and the success of the New York charter school program.
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implemented to manufacture and sell products to Soviet Citizens. 20 Like the former Soviet system, consumer choice and competition do not exist in the current American public school system.
Therefore, schools have few incentives to provide a quality product
to captive customers. Thus, no public school is rewarded for demonstrating outstanding performance or fails for exhibiting substandard performance.
This Article contends that attempts to effectuate "reform"
within the current paradigm of providing education are misguided. It further argues for replacing producer subsidies that allow
predation of private schools with demand subsidies to parents who
could then select one of several schools for their child to attend
(i.e., the School Choice Proposal). Accordingly, a substantial number of new privately-owned schools would enter the lower-level
education market to meet the increased demand. As such, the
School Choice Proposal would dismantle the public school monopoly and lead to a marketplace of multiple private providers. Thus,
those schools that neglected to improve quality would fail in a
competitive market, unlike in the present public school monopoly
that shelters schools from market discipline and perpetuates the
existence of failing schools. More importantly, a market dominated by private providers that are individually rewarded for outstanding performance would create an appropriate incentive system to improve the overall quality of lower-level education in
America.
This Article advocates that introducing school choice should
be the first step in educational reform. A parent in each school
district would have three alternatives. The parent could:2 1
1. Allow the school district to assign their child to a school;
2. Send their child to any public school that accepts the child, either
inside or outside the child's school district; or
3. Accept a state funded scholarship voucher, in an amount at least
equal to the average private school tuition or at most equal to the
state expenditure per pupil in the public school system. The voucher
would serve to fund the child's attendance at either religious or
secular private schools.
Education is an economic good. In other words, more education is better than less education. Beginning with the normative
premise that allocating economic goods should maximize consumer
welfare rather than producer welfare,2 2 the education market-

20. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of central
planning in the former Soviet Union of all commercial activity according to the a
five-year projection developed by Gosplan.
21. This plan resembles the plan proposed by Delaware Governor Pierre
duPont. See duPont, supra note 1, at 132.
22. See generally EDGAR K BROWNING & JACQUELINE M. BROWNING, MICROECO-
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place should reflect a competitive market2 3 not a monopoly.24
Following with a subsidiary normative premise that private actors, subject to market determination of success or failure, more
efficiently accomplish tasks than public actors, private enterprises, rather than public institutions, should, therefore, provide education to avoid wasting social resources.
The nature of any monopoly dictates that the monopolist will
expend resources to preserve its franchise. The benefactors of the
present system, the education establishment, are well-organized
in powerful labor unions that actively lobby legislatures and successfully preserve the status quo.25 Achieving school choice in the
political arena will be an arduous task. This Article attempts to
generate ideological support for the school choice concept, especially from those inclined to viscerally reject the proposition based on
the rhetoric advanced by the education establishment or from a
mistaken notion that if government does not operate schools, children will not receive an education.
The education establishment attempts to perpetuate the
present system by aligning itself with a sympathetic constituent,
the poor, and portraying itself as the' guardian of the poor. Yet,
the class welfare approach is particularly egregious because the
public school monopoly has condemned the inner-city poor to failing institutions and has done more to make their low-income
status permanent by denying them effective educational opportunities.2 6 The education establishment claims that school choice
will benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. 27 This assertion
is patently false. Students who attend wealthy suburban schools
are not the primary beneficiaries of school choice. Rather, students in the inner-city are the primary beneficiaries of school
choice. Polly Williams, an ardent inner-city activist for school
choice for low-income students in Milwaukee, Wisconsin appropri2
ately condemns the paternalism of the public school system.
NOMIC THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 568-94 (1986) (discussing welfare economics
theory).
23. A competitive market is composed of many different firms producing a similar product. Id. at 251. Factors used to determine the competitiveness of a market
include: 1) the number of buyers and sellers; 2) the mobility of resources; 3) the
homogeneity of the product; and 4) the amount of relevant information possessed
by the buyers and sellers. Id. at 251-53.
24. A monopoly exists when only one firm sells in a given market Id. at 329.
See id. at 329-31 (discussing the characteristics of monopolies). See generally id. at
549-57, 364-66 (comparing monopolistic markets and competitive markets).
25. Peyser, supra note 2, at 622-23 (discussing the strength and organization of
teachers and administrators as lobbyists against education reform).
26. Schmitz, supra note 8, at 1641-47.
27. Amy Christine Hevly, Note, Nothing Simple or Certain: Establishment
Clause Barriers to Choice in American Education, 35 ARiz. L. REV. 467, 470-71
(1993).
28. Thomas Hetland, The Milwaukee Choice Program, in PRIVATIZING EDUCA-
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She states, "if liberals are so good for black people, why are we in
such bad shape."29 Therefore, the inner-city poor are the foremost beneficiaries of an educational voucher that would allow

them to escape to better schools, and have an opportunity to improve their standard of living.
Few should disagree with the goal of better educating American children. Many, however, disagree on the means of achieving
that goal. In selecting the appropriate means, education reform
must confront a simple threshold issue which is often ignored:
whether production should occur through a government-operated
monopoly, or whether America should open its market to competition. 3' The education establishment's rhetoric suggests that the
goal of education reform is merely government provision, rather
than improving the quality of education. Conversely, school choice
is not proposed as the end to be achieved. Instead, school choice is
proposed as a means toward creating a system that achieves the
goal of providing American children with a better education without wasting social resources. For that reason, the time to implement school choice is now.
I. EDUCATING AMERICA'S YOUTH
Far too many studies paint a bleak picture of the academic
performance of American elementary and secondary students.
High school graduation rates have plummeted. 31 Absenteeism
has dramatically increased.32 Only half of all high school seniors
can locate France on a map. 33 Thirteen percent of seventeen-

year-old students are illiterate, and that number rises to forty
percent when surveying minorities. 34 Additionally, less than
twenty percent can solve a math problem involving fractions.3 5

TION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES 184 (Simon

Hakin et al. eds., 1994)
29. Id.
30. See generally Philip T.K Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Education
Choice: Can the Polemic of Legal Problems be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1
(1993).
31.

JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S

SCHOOLS 9 (1990) (stating that approximately 25% of the nation's high school students failed to graduate).
32. This includes absenteeism among teachers. Robert A. Frahm and Brant
Houston, Chalk Up Teacher Absenteeism as One More Woe of Big-City Schools,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 7, 1993, at Al; Leroy Williams Jr., Denver Teacher Absenteeism Four Times Rate Among 79 Employers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 14,
1993, at 17A.
33. Caspar W. Weinberger, When Our Schools Do Badly - So Does America,
FORBES, Oct. 21, 1991, at 31.
34. See Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of For-Profit Corporationsin Revitalizing
Public Education:A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 883, 887 (1993).
35. See duPont, supra note 1, at 121.
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In 1983, the National Commission on Educational Excellence
reported that the "average achievement of high school students on
most standardized tests is now lower than ...when Sputnik was
launched in 1957. "3" The combined math and verbal scores on
the Scholastic Aptitude Test (S.A.T.) have dropped from 978 in
1963 to 902 in 1993, and the absolute number of "outstanding"
scores on the verbal portion, a score of 600 or more, have declined
by more than thirty percent since 1972." 7
American students compare miserably to foreign students on
international standardized tests, particularly in the areas of math
and science. 38 Knowledge in these academic subjects is critical to
technological advancements in industry.3 9 According to former
U.S. Secretary of Education, Lauro Cavazos, "the top five percent
of our high school students know less about math than the average high school student in Japan."4 ° Moreover, powerful anecdotal evidence of business executives supports the statistics depicting
the dramatic decline in the quality of American education. 4' For
example, in 1989, Allstate Insurance Company sponsored a survey
in which business leaders gave American public education a "C,42 Thus, the deterioration in education directly impacts the
competitiveness of American industry.4 3
As a result, America's "human capital"" has become comparatively less valuable than that of our foreign competitors. In
the modern and complex global economy, productivity gains heavily depend on "brain power," instead of rote rule-following. 45 Yet,
American labor does not effectively think or learn on the job.4"
Thus, American manufacturers desperately seek, but nonetheless
suffer, a severe shortage of skilled labor.4 v Moreover, the Ameri-

36. Peyser, supra note 2, at 627.
37. Id.; duPont, supra note 1, at 122. In 1995, S.A.T. scores increased. Many experts, however, attribute the increase to a "radical" change in the test format rather than an improvement in education. See Steven Stecklow, S.A.T. Scores Rise
Strongly After Test is Overhauled, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1995, at B1. For example,
average scores on the American College Test (A.C.T.) did not improve. Id.
38. CHU3B & MOE, supra note 31, at 8.
39. Id.
40. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 4.
41. Tom Feeney, Why Educational Choice: The Florida Experience, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES

52 (Simon Hakim et al. eds., 1994).
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. "Human capital" is an individual's ability to perform useful services. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 484. See also Paul B. Stephan III, Federal
Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1358-66 (1984) (dis-

cussing generally the "human capital" concept).
45. Id.
46. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 9.
47. Raju Narisetti, Job Paradox: Manufacturers Decry A Shortage of Workers
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can economy has lost an estimated twenty-five to thirty billion
dollars due to reduced productivity, errors and accidents solely
attributable to illiteracy." In addition, the cost of 700,000 high
school dropouts each year amounts to $240 billion in lost wages
and foregone taxes over their lifetime.49 Thus, the deterioration
of America's educational system partially explains the decline in
American competitiveness against Asian and European economies.5 °
The quality of education not only impacts the overall economic health of a country, but dictates the welfare of the citizens
within that country. Education is a crucial means of improving
the standard of living of persons and communities because employers generally place a higher value on prospective educated
employees. 5 Concentrations of better educated persons (i.e., a
relatively more educated labor pool) attracts industry into communities. 52 The inability to attract businesses into the inner-city
results from failing to provide educational opportunities to those
living in the urban core.53 Unfortunately, crime and social decay
are the attendant consequences of the failure to appropriately
educate inner-city residents.54
Although the official mantra of public education is its claim
that "the poor and the oppressed [are its] greatest beneficiaries,"55 the American education system has particularly stifled
the opportunity for economic advancement of those students in the
lowest economic stratum." The performance statistics of innercity school systems reflect grave disparities when compared to

While Rejecting Many, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1995, at Al.
48. Simon Hakim et al., Introduction, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES 1 (Simon Hakim et al. eds.,
1994).
49. See Solomon, supra note 34, at 888.
50. See Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 1. See also Solomon, supra note 34, at

885-87.
51. Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 1; Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty
and Failure in the Market for Children's Human Capital, 81 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1947
(1993). See also The Nature of Poverty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1995, at A16 (citing a
Census Bureau study that stated, "[a]nyone who possesses a high school diploma... is highly unlikely to be poor long.").
52. See Selwin Price, Location Matters to Manufacturers, INDUS. WK., Oct. 2,
1989, at 50. A skilled workforce ranked as the second most important criteria for
manufacturers when selecting a location. Id. Moreover, "the skill level of the local
workforce ... is likely to become increasingly [important] in the future." Id.
53. See generally Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes,
Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1351 (1993).
54. Id. at 1362-69
55. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE 151 (1980)
(quoting Leonard Billet, The Free Market Approach to EducationalReform, Rand
Paper P-6141, at 27-28 (1978)).
56. Schmitz, supra note 8, at 1657.
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national averages, or to the performance of neighboring wealthier
suburbs.57 Decaying urban school systems dictate a bifurcation of
society based on education, which leads to social conflict.
Many offer explanations for the decline in the quality of
American education. Some proffer that the breakdown in family
values, has created the problem when in fact, this is merely the
consequence of the decline. Others claim that the public schools
function adequately. Additionally, several in the education establishment contend that more money will solve the problem.58 Ironically, however, America spends more on elementary and secondary education than most other industrial countries. In recent
years, the United States has spent $213 billion, or 4.1% of Gross
National Product (GNP), on lower level education. 9 Clearly, underspending is not the problem and reform within the system is
not the solution. Instead, this Article posits that the decline in
academic achievement is the direct result of the established system used to deliver education to elementary and secondary students, and that education reform must envision transforming the
provider of education from a public sector monopoly to a panoply
of private sector providers.
A. Central Planningand Monopolization
At the beginning of the twentieth century, schooling was a
local affair. ° Local schools catered to and reflected the values of
the local community.61 The families, neighborhoods and community directly influenced the curriculum, budget and personnel
decisions. 62 Principals and teachers were therefore directly accountable to their consumers, (e.g., students and parents).63 Although attendance did not become mandatory in all fifty states
until 1918, schooling was nearly universal despite the absence of
mandatory attendance laws.64
During the Progressive Era, a reform movement expanded
the government's role in providing lower-level education and consolidated authority over individual schools in distant governmental institutions.6 5 The reform movement criticized the then-exist-

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
Jerry

Id. at 1642.
See duPont, supra note 1, at 122-23.
Solomon, supra note 34, at 887 & n.15.
CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 150-62. See also David Beers &
Ellig, An Economic View of the Effectiveness of Public and Private Schools,

reprinted in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS,

AND EXPERIENCES 25-27 (Simon Hakim et al. eds., 1994)
65. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 4; FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55,
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ing fragmented and parochial system of education.66 Reformers
replaced the decentralized system with centralized governing institutions staffed by "impartial education experts" who were devoted to the public interest.67 Centralization reduced the number
of school districts from 100,000 in 1945 to 16,000 today. Because
centralization diminished the control of an individual over the
distant political body,68 as professional educators at the district,
state and federal level took control of the public school system,
parents correspondingly lost influence over the education that
local schools provided.69 Most major policy decisions regarding
curriculum, course content and textbooks became, and still are,
made at the state level.7" District level officials were relegated to
implementing directives and roles with little influence. 71 Individual schools, the bottom rung of the hierarchy, had little discretion
in determining the manner in which its students received an
education. 2 This system arose under the premise that distant
bureaucrats "knew best what kind of education
people needed and
7
how it could be provided most effectively." 1
Presently, the system educates American students almost
exclusively through this nearly universally followed public school
system format.74 States compel attendance in accredited institutions and communities make public schools available throughout
school districts. 5 Originally, cities exclusively financed school
systems by assessing local property taxes.7" Now, however, most
public school systems receive at least half of their funding from
state governments. Moreover, the federal government has expanded its role in funding public school systems. 7 Thus, private
schools are not an economically feasible alternative for most families because parents pay taxes to support the public school system
and would need to pay an additional tuition to enroll their child
in a private school. 79 As a result, nearly ninety percent of all eleat 150.
66. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 4.
67. Id.
68. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 155.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance 'Reform" May Not Be Good Policy,
28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 433 (1991).
73. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 4.
74. Nearly 87% of all students attend public schools. Peyser, supra note 2, at
622 n.13.
75. Id.
76. Hanushek, supra note 72, at 433.
77. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 155; RINEHART & LEE, supra note
11, at 89.
78. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 155.
79. Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of Property in Post-So-
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mentary and secondary students attend public schools. 80 Thus,
the existence of "free" neighborhood public schools creates a virtual monopoly in the public school system.8"
Centralization of decision-making in the public school system
eliminates direct accountability of the decision-maker at the top of
the hierarchy to the students and parents at the bottom of the
hierarchy.82 The decision-maker does not personally confront or
assess the impact of the thousands of decisions necessary to operate a school system. 3 Most important, the decision-maker is never disciplined for making erroneous decisions because consumer
autonomy does not exist.84 The education reformers developed a
uniform curriculum and institutional setting that parents often
viewed as inappropriately servicing the diverse talents, interests,
desires and needs of their children.8 ' Teachers genuinely sympathize with the plight of parents, but, despite their efforts, a centralized, monopolized, uniform system cannot address or respond
to the parent's unique demands.8 6
Essentially, the public school system delivers education to
American students under the same central planning principles
that factories in the former Soviet Union applied to the manufacture and delivery of products.8 7 For example, in the former Soviet Union, all commercial activity was centrally planned according to a five-year projection developed by Gosplan.88 Each stateowned enterprise (SOE) produced according to Gosplan, regardless
of changes in economic circumstances.89 This approach resembles
developing curriculum plans at the state or district level, and
American public school teachers rigidly following such plans. 0
Continuing the analogy, Soviet markets only sold Soviet products,
and Soviet citizens therefore could not choose between competing
products.9 Similarly, American parents cannot send their children to alternative schools because they cannot afford to pay the
double tax.92 Thus, public schools enjoy a de facto monopoly
cialist Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 131,
135 (1993).
80. Peyser, supra note 2, at 620; RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 1.
81. Peyser, supra note 2, at 622.
82. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 155.
83. SEYMORE FLIEGEL & JAMES MAcGUIRE, MIRACLE IN EAST HARLEM: THE
FIGHT FOR CHOICE IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 26 (1993).

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 26.
87. Beers & Ellig, supra note 64, at 24. See generally Baev, supra note 79, at
135 (describing Gosplan practices).
88. Baev, supra note 79, at 135.
89. Id. at 136-37.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The "double tax" refers to the burden on parents who send their children to
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nearly identical in design and effect as the former Soviet
SOE's.9"
The Soviet economy collapsed and the American education
system is declining because two systemic problems are inherent in
a centrally planned system. First, central planning cannot anticipate spontaneous events or accommodate the individual needs of
consumers. 94 A one-size-fits-all formula simply does not work.
Second, central planning operates with a flawed incentive system
because it fails to reward outstanding performance, innovation or
production." As such, dismal performance is pre-determined.
B. The Unavoidable Bureaucracy in Public Institutions:Money
Lost and an Inability to Adapt

Bureaucratic control, rather than competition and consumer
choice, are the norm in the public school system. 96 Illustrative of
the expansive bureaucracy, school administrative staff increased
500% between 1960 and 1984, though student enrollment increased only nine percent.9 7 Presently, non-teaching staff outnumbers teachers. 98 The New York public school system illustrates the absurd "model of bureaucratic pathology" common to
public school systems. 99 John Chubb compared the staffing of the
central offices of the New York City public school system and the
Catholic school system. °0 The public school system employed
6,000 administrators, whereas the Catholic school system's administrative office employed only twenty-five people to manage a
school system. 10 ' Thus, the Catholic school employed one-fifth
the size of the public system.0 2 Professor Nathan Glazer of the

private school. These parents pay taxes to support the public school system as well
as private tuition. The economic cost of private tuition includes the foregone benefit of the state expenditure per pupil available from attending the public system.
See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the predation of
private schools by public schools to establish market monopoly that results from
the double tax.
93. Baev, supra note 79, at 136-37.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Beers & Ellig, supra note 64, at 20-21.
97. Peyser, supra note 2, at 622.
98. Id.
99. FLIEGEL & MAcGUIRE, supra note 83, at 26 (quoting DAVID ROGERS & NORMAN H. CHUNG, LIVINGSTON STREET REVISITED 110 (1983)).
100. Id. at 26-27.
101. Id.

102. Id. (discussing John Chubb's study of the New York City Public School System). A similar comparison was made in Washington, D.C. where the Catholic
school system services 50,000 students with 17 administrators, and the public
school system supports 81,000 students with 1,500 administrative workers. See
Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 4.
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Harvard Graduate School of Education commented that:
[in the public school system, there are] so many rules and regulations and levels of control that it's impossible to do anything. It is
literally impossible to build a new school within the New York City
school system in less than eight years, which was why a law had to
be passed creating an independent school construction authority
that promises completion in two years." 3
Bureaucracy inherently permeates government monopolies.
The absence of external competition allows those operating in a
government-operated monopoly to meet their own needs first, and
the customer's needs second. 1°' Public employees can exploit the
built-in conflict of interest between their personal welfare and
that of taxpayers because the mechanism to check these agency
costs (i.e., a competitive market), is non-existent. 0 5 Agency
costs, or the incentive of managers to act in their own self-interest
rather than on behalf of the producer, result from the separation
of ownership and control. 10 6 For example, in many corporations
no single shareholder owns a sufficient portion of stock necessary
to justify the cost of monitoring corporate management. As such,
executives have an incentive to "pad" expense accounts, travel
first class and create various other unnecessary costs for the corporation. Shareholders, however, can at least indirectly monitor
agency costs by comparing the financial performance of other
comparable companies.
In a relatively competitive market, managers subject to such
market discipline cannot extort unreasonable agency costs. On the
other hand, with respect to the public school monopoly or other
monopolies, agency costs are exorbitant. In the public school system, agency costs are reflected in the needless layers of bureaucracy. However, taxpayers as a group are more dispersed than
shareholders in a corporation, and are exposed, individually, to
less of a financial stake. Therefore, taxpayers have little incentive
to discover and correct such abuses.
Not surprisingly, a substantial body of evidence ineluctably
leads to the conclusion that private sector providers are more
efficient than public sector providers. 0 7 Unlike private sector
providers, bureaucrats in the public school system do not spend
their own money, they do not become directly accountable for the
return on money spent, and therefore, they become insensitive to

103. FLIEGEL & MACGUIRE, supra note 83, at 27-28.
104. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 93.

105. Id.
106. See generally George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237 (1983).
107. See Michael H. Schill, PrivatizingFederal Low Income Housing Assistance:
The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 883 & n.13 (1990).
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costs imposed on taxpayers as a result of their decisions. The selfaggrandizing behavior by bureaucrats leads to expansion in budgets, programmatic authority and other administrative controls.1 °8 The utopian ideal of public officials expending extraordinary effort, with little personal gain, simply does not jibe with the
fundamentals of human nature (i.e., the pursuit of our own selfinterest, as we perceive that to be).10 9 In the end, expenditures
on unnecessary bureaucracy waste the resources that should be
1
used to educate children.
The bureaucratic structure of the public school system, however, not only wastes resources, but directly impedes improving
the quality of education. Bureaucrats acting in their self-interest,
(e.g., job preservation or advancement), often reject meritorious
proposals due to tangential factors that require the official to
favor a particular special interest group."1 Officials with the
motivation to make positive changes have little incentive to pursue these changes because they receive no additional
renumeration, yet, incur direct non-monetary costs from the work
they create.1 1 2 Moreover, the hierarchical structure tends to perpetuate a school-wide and system-wide inertia which affects students, parents, teachers and principals."' The smothering bureaucracy produces a "psychic estrangement" from the school, and
general disaffection from the agents of the public school
system."' Of greatest concern, therefore, is not the wasted resources, but the effect of the overly hierarchical, rule-bound, formalistic approach present in the public school system on innovation and efforts to improve education.
Numerous experiments with education indicate that an autonomous and decentralized structure leads to dramatic improvement in the academic performance of students." 5 John Chubb
and Terry Moe concluded in their heralded 1990 study of public
schools that "the more extensive this control by external authorities, the less likely schools are to be organized effectively....
High levels of autonomy from external authority tend to be associated with high levels of organizational effectiveness, and vice
versa."" 6 Specifically, principals in schools that produce the

108. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 46.
109. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 40.
110. Id.
111. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 46.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. FLIEGEL & MACGUIRE, supra note 83, at 192.
115. See generally id.
116. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 150-52. Chubb and Moe analyzed more
than 20,000 students in a nationwide sample of 500 schools.. Id. at 9. Their analysis of school organization divided those schools in the top quartile of a distribution
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highest achievement score gains experience substantially lower
interference from superintendents and central office administrators, particularly in areas of curriculum content, instructional
methods and the autonomy to hire and fire teachers." '
The notion that school autonomy leads to improved student
performance underlies charter school programs." 8 In District
Four of East Harlem, New York, a group of education pioneers
developed a group of alternative public schools, operating away
from the restrictions of the public school system. 119 Teachers became rejuvenated when the school system removed the bureaucratic rules and regulations, thus, allowing them to freely develop
curricula. 2 ° Eventually, that system permitted parents to send
their children to any school in the district. 12 ' The improvement
in student performance was staggering. From 1974, when the
school system established the inter-district school choice and alternative schools program, to the present, District Four improved
its rank among the thirty-two districts in the New York public
school system from thirty-two to twenty-two. 22 Additionally, the
percentage of students reading at or above their grade level more
than doubled and more students were admitted to selective high
schools.2 3
C. Protecting the Franchiseat the Expense of the Consumer
The bureaucratic structure of the public school system is
incompatible with improving academic performance. Allocating
resources through the public sector unavoidably leads to an overly
bureaucratic structure, especially when that institution enjoys a
monopoly position. 24 Efforts to alter the bureaucratic scheme,
however, are destined to meet substantial resistance from those
with a vested interest in the status quo. 25 The beneficiary of a
legislated monopoly expends resources to maintain the franchise

of achievement gain scores are classified as "effectively organized" and those in the
bottom quartile as "ineffectively organized." Id. at 143.
117. Id. Autonomy to hire and fire teachers was particularly more prevalent in
effective schools than ineffective schools, yet this remains one area where teacher
unions typically constrain principals, Id. at 154. The strict seniority systems and
impediments on a principal's ability to select personnel according to his best professional judgment perpetuates mediocrity among teachers. Id. at 154-55.
118. See infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text for a description of charter
schools.
119. See FLIEGEL & MACGUIRE, supra note 83, at 3-15.
120. Id. at 5-6.
121. Id. at 6.
122. Id. at 231.
123. Id. at 225-31.
124. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 46.
125. Id.; FLIEGEL & MACGUIRE, supra note 83, at 192.
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(e.g, vote-gathering, lobbying and campaigning).'26 Not surprisingly, the education establishment, like any monopolist, has a
vested interest in protecting its franchise and actively opposes
12 7
efforts to introduce competition among schools for students.
Joseph Alibrandi, an advocate of school choice reform in California, describes the reaction of the education establishment to an
innovative charter school established in Corona, California. 12
According to Alibrandi, the school revised its curriculum, established a car pool network to attract students from outside the
community and required a commitment from parents to work
toward the academic success of their children. 129 The school was
tremendously successful, and parents went so far as to sleep overnight in the playground to ensure a priority position for their
child's enrollment application. 3 ° Yet:
How did the public schools react? Its constituents wrote letters
complaining about the competing school's car pool system, how
traffic is blocked, and the various rules the alternative school was
violating.... Instead of reacting the way any business or institution should react [when faced with competition], that is, look at
what their competition is doing and come up with something better,
they argue[d] and battle[d] [in the political arena to shut down their
competition]. 3'
The public school monopoly negates consumer choice and
operates to maximize producer welfare rather than consumer welfare. 3 2 Simple intuition suggests that, when a legislated arrangement establishes that a producer cannot lose its customers,
the producer need not strive to serve those customers effectively.
Moreover, a monopolist can "pass on" its costs to the customer,
because the customer has no alternate provider. 3 Predictably,
providers (teachers and administrators) have flourished in the
public school system regime, while consumers (students and parents) have perished. Inflation-adjusted expenditure in the public
school system has increased 400% since 1950.34 Teacher salaries have increased an inflation-adjusted fifty percent since 1960,

126. Porter & Davis, supra note 18, at 423.
127. Peyser, supra note 2, at 622.

128. Joseph F. Alibrandi, A Business Person's Perspective: Pro-Choice, in PROCEEDINGS: THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY/URBAN SCHOOLS

NATIONAL TASK FORCE: SCHOOL CHOICE 53-55 (Richard M. Bossone and Irwin H.
Polishook eds., 1992).
129. Id. at 54.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 55.
132. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 351-57 (discussing the welfare
cost of monopolies).
133. Id.
134. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 7.
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while class sizes have declined by one-third and teachers have
been relieved of many administrative duties they previously performed."' 5 Notably, private schools, on average, spend fifty percent of the amount per student that public schools spend.'36 Yet,
student performance in those private schools generally exceeds
student performance in the public schools.'3 7
The decided advantages to producers from a system insulated
from competition indicates that legislative changes to the public
education system will be difficult to achieve. According to the
economic theory of legislation, "legislative protection flows to
those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of
overall social welfare."3 ' Educators benefitting from the current

system enjoy efficient organization through powerful unions that
ardently strive to perpetuate the existing system.'39 Consumers
and taxpayers harmed by the current system face much higher
organizational costs because they are dispersed throughout a
community with a more attenuated connection to one another °
than educators (i.e., who at least share a common avocation).1'
Thus, consumer groups form
relatively less effective political coali4
'
change.1
legislate
to
tions
Although some consumer groups can be tenacious, teacher
and administrator groups are relentless because their jobs are at
stake. 4 s For this reason, even when school choice enjoys widespread support, 1" voucher proposals often meet defeat in the political arena.'4 Even when states cautiously experiment with
school choice, the education establishment exercises its political
clout to dilute the scope of the program, 4 increase its control

135. Beers & EUig, supra note 64, at 19.
136. Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 4. The lower cost is attributed to teachers
performing administrative duties, lower teacher salaries and substantially less
administrative staff. Id.
137. See id. Private schools place 10% to 15% more students at the appropriate
grade level than public schools; the dropout rate in private schools is half the public school rate; twice as many students take the S.A.T. in private schools, and the
overall score was 36 points higher. Id.
138. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).
139. See Peyser, supra note 2, at 622 (noting that the National Education Association, the largest teachers' union, has a political action fund of $22.5 million and
an annual budget of $750 million).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 101.
143. Id. at 144 (1989 Gallup Poll indicating 67% of nonwhites and 59% of whites
favor school choice).
144. Id.
145. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program initially was made available only
to 1,000 students. See infra notes 602-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Wisconsin Constitution-based attacks on the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program.
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over the program 1 6 and pre-ordain lackluster results. 147 Thus,
the public school system not only exacts deadweight loss from its
monopoly market structure, but also creates deadweight loss from
the resources expended to obtain "rent-seeking" legislation that
perpetuates the monopoly. 48
Education leaders advocate reform within the context of the
existing system."" Yet, a politically motivated institution acting
as market monopolists cannot maximize societal'welfare. 5 ° That
framework will maximize producer, rather than consumer, welfare. 5' Until individual schools become subject to competition,
and face the prospect of losing their livelihood if unable to meet
the needs of their consumers, those public schools will remain
complacent. Educational quality will stagnate. Bureaucracy will
perpetuate, and expenditure in that system will continue to waste

resources. 152
Education has suffered from the same mistaken premise that
has befallen the modern welfare state. The premise is that centralized rule by command more effectively achieves the desired
end than voluntary action.' 5' Command systems eventually
serve the needs of those in command at the expense of those it
designed the system to benefit. 154 Vast bureaucracies emerge
that devote resources to shifting paperwork rather than serving
the intended beneficiaries. 5 5 Despite noble objectives of welfare

146. New Hampshire introduced a school voucher, but the education establishment transformed the program into "an administrative nightmare." See John
Menge, The Evaluation of the New Hampshire Plan: An Early Voucher System,
reprinted in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS,
AND EXPERIENCES 163 (Simon Hakim et al. eds., 1994).
147. Professor John Coons, a staunch supporter of the voucher system, refused to
support the Colorado voucher initiative because of dilution. See John E. Coons, An
Educator's Perspective: Pro-Choice, in PROCEEDINGS: THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY/URBAN SCHOOLS NATIONAL TASK FORCE: SCHOOL CHOICE
42 (Richard M. Bossone & Irwin H. Polishook eds., 1992).
148. Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471,
478-79 (1988).
149. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 12.
150. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 351-52.
151. Id.
152. The Theory of Bureaucratic Displacement dictates that in a "bureaucratic
system ...increase in expenditure will be matched by fall in production.... Such
systems will act rather like 'black holes' in the economic universe, simultaneously
sucking in resources and shrinking in terms of 'emitted' production." See FRIEDMAN
& FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 155 (quoting Max Gammon who studied the British
National Health Service). The Theory thus describes the public school system - a
lower output (falling S.A.T. scores) for increasing amounts of input (expenditures
increasing 400%). Id.
153. See id. at 187-88.
154. Id.
155. FLIEGEL & MAcGUIRE, supra note 83, at 192.
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programs, the results remain disappointing and will never improve as long as a system of government provision continues.
America is in the midst of unshackling Progressive-Era policies
that imposed substantial governmental intervention on the actions of private market participants, recognizing that goods and
social resources are more efficiently allocated by voluntary exchange than by command. Recognizing this simple proposition,
now is the time for school choice.
II. SCHOOL CHOICE
School reform re-emerged during the 1980s as an issue demanding national attention.' 56 The widely publicized decline in
academic performance corresponded with a perceived decline in
the industrial competitiveness of the United States, especially
with Japan. 117 To many, the superior academic performance of
Japanese high school students correlated with the strength of the
Japanese *economy.158 The decline in the American education
system threatened America's position as a world leader, and in
particular, the standard of living of all Americans. 5 9
Responding to the crisis in American education, states undertook reform efforts, appointing nearly 300 different task forces 6to0
study the education system and make recommendations.
Probably the most controversial reform proposal was the concept
of school choice. 6' According to the School Choice Proposal, each
student would receive a state voucher to buy private education.' 62 As a result, neighborhood public schools would lose their
geographic monopoly because parents, under the proposal, would
be able to afford private school tuition.'63
Introducing meaningful consumer choice among public and
private schools would force all schools to compete for students
based on the quality of education provided. Schools would finally
become accountable to their customers. If a school failed to provide a quality product, according to that customer's definition of
"quality education," then that school would not survive. Since free
enterprise and competition has led to the most successful product
innovations, why not apply those principles to education?

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 20-21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20-21.
Id.
Id.
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A. A Short Primer on Various School Choice Proposals
Developing a common vocabulary will probably minimize
ambiguity among reform proposals and avoid a knee-jerk rejection
toward any reform blanketed with the "school choice" label. The
broadest definition of "school choice" includes any effort to make
schools compete for students. The degree of competition, however,
varies tremendously among school choice proposals. Presently, of
course, all parents have the choice to send their child to any private school. Unfortunately, very few families have the economic
means to afford private tuition, especially when public schools are
"free." The producer subsidies to public schools allows effective
predation of private schools, thereby leading to a market structure
that educates ninety percent of all students in the public school
system. 16
The first category of school choice proposals involves choice
only among public schools." The National Education Association equivocally supports "choice plans at the local level." 6 6 According to this category, the public school monopoly would continue under such a system, and the effects of the monopoly on cost
and quality seemingly would remain.'67 Public school choice proposals offer two variations. The first variation is the intra-district
public school choice proposal."6 Intra-district public school
choice allows students to attend any public school within their
school district and comprises the most limited introduction of
competition among schools. 169 Under this scheme, each school
would offer the same curriculum developed by the school
board.' 7' Because all the schools would basically offer the same
curriculum, most parents would likely select a school based on
proximity, resulting in a student landscape nearly identical to the
present system. 17 ' The inter-district public school choice proposal is the other variation. 172 According to that variation, students
may enroll in schools outside their school district. 17 ' This option

164. Peyser, supra note 2, at 622.
165. W.W. Herenton, A Legislator's Perspective: Anti-Choice, in PROCEEDINGS:

THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY/URBAN SCHOOLS NATIONAL
TASK FORCE: SCHOOL CHOICE 75 (Richard M. Bossone & Irwin H. Polishook eds.,

1992).
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 1.
Id.

170. Id.

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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is sometimes referred to as open public school enrollment.'74
The next step on the choice spectrum entails developing charter schools. v5 Charter schools are an attempt to re-establish local control over the curriculum, including the selection of teachers
and principals, and the overall management of the operations of a
public school. 76 The school would continue to receive state
funding and thus, would not require tuition.'77 However, the
school would operate essentially free of state-imposed education
regulations.'78
Typically, state teacher unions strenuously oppose charter
school programs, and legislatures, succumbing to pressure from
179
these unions, often limit the number of charters permitted.
Moreover, before chartering a school, parents and other interested
parties must receive approval from their local school board. 80
School boards, however, predictably fail to authorize charters
because permitting charters would create competition for
students.' 8 ' Competition for students would lead to a loss of
public funds from the district to the charter school.' 82
The second category of school choice proposals entails offering
students a state voucher to pay private school tuition.8 3 The
voucher serves to eliminate some, if not all, of the "double tax"
parents incur by sending their children to private schools.'
The voucher stimulates consumer demand for private education.1'5 This demand would lead to an increase in the supply of
private schools. 186 Many voucher proposals would apply only to
non-sectarian schools to avoid the inevitable constitutional controversy that would arise if the voucher could be used at religious
schools. 8 7 Because most non-public schools have a religious affiliation, limiting the voucher system to non-sectarian schools only

174. Id.
175. FLIEGEL & MAcGUIRE, supra note 83, at 192.
176. Id. at 193.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Tom Triplett, Choice Through CharterSchools, in PROCEEDINGS: THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY/URBAN SCHOOLS NATIONAL TASK FORCE:
SCHOOL CHOICE 21 (Richard M. Bossone and Irwin H. Polishook eds., 1992).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional
Analysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 423 (1995) (discussing the economic theory
behind offering vouchers for private school education and constitutional issues
related to the use of state-funded vouchers for private education).
184. Peyser, supra note 2, at 621-22.
185. Stick, supra note 183, at 427-32.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 432-60.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 29:75

nominally increases competition for students. 188 Even if the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld using state vouchers at sectarian schools,
some would probably remain viscerally opposed to "public dollars"
supporting religious schools.8 9 Moreover, some state constitutions require a stricter separation of church and state than the
federal constitution. 190
More radical proposals of completely privatizing the provision
of higher education have not been advanced for elementary and
secondary education.' 9' Apparently, a stronger notion of the
public good aspect of lower-level education, or lingering agreement
with Thomas Mann's assertion that government has an affirmative duty to provide education, preempts discussion on such reforms.' 92 The merits of a completely privatized higher education
system with public finance to those individuals who meet the
subsidization criteria should seemingly apply to lower-level education as well. 93 Private institutions tend to educate more effectively at a lower cost. 194 As such, although privatization has not
been prominent in the education reform debate, 95 several entrepreneurs have established operational plans to enter the market
for lower-level education on a grand scale thereby increasing the
presence of private sector producers.' 96
Other school reform proposals, although literally unrelated to
"school choice," attempt to instill market principles to remedy
systemic problems that currently exist in the delivery of education. Education Alternatives Inc. (EAI) contracts with school
boards to privately operate public schools.' 97 EAI's focus is to
improve educational quality by introducing new pedagogical methods and replacing existing methods of school management.'9 8
Again, the prevailing thought is that production is better left to

188. Id. at 430.
189. Id. at 469.

190. See infra note 536 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases interpreting separation of church and state clauses from state constitutions.
191. See Kevin C. Sontheimer, Privatizing Higher Education, in PRIVATIZING
EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES 145

(Simon Hakim et al. eds., 1994).
192. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 184.
193. See Sontheimer, supra note 191, at 146.
194. Julie Huston Vallarelli, State ConstitutionalRestraints on the Privatization
of Education, 72 B.U. L. REV. 381, 386-87 (1992).
195. See infra notes 576-603 and accompanying text for a discussion of litigation
over state constitutional rights of students in poor school districts to an education
equal to that of students in rich school districts.
196. Whittle Communications plans to establish a network of 2,000 private
schools nationwide by the year 2012. See Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 7.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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the private sector than the public sector.199 Although EAI has
only operated for less than three years and no conclusive evidence
can confirm objective improvement in educational quality, preliminary evaluations of the schools in which EAI has operated indicates that "[t]hey appear to be practicing the best principles of
learning available today, implementing sound governance techparents to [become] part of their
niques... , and empowering
20 0
education."
children's
Importantly, the voucher system is not mutually exclusive of
any of the previously mentioned alternatives. For example, the
proposal in this Article advocates combining open public school
enrollment with a voucher redeemable at any private school.20 '
School districts, within this framework, could decide to contract
with EAI to manage their schools. In the alternative, the state
could determine, if the voucher plan led to large scale defections
from public schools, that it should play no role in providing education. Instead, it would merely accredit private schools and provide
students with the financial support. On the other hand, state
schools could become so desirable that no one avails themselves to
the voucher. Regardless of the outcome, the principle behind
school choice is simple: any and all parents, not a state bureaucrat in a distant locale, should and will decide where their child
will attend school.
B. Responding to the Public School Monopoly Argument
Those who support the present system bear the burden of
establishing why parents should not freely choose where their
children will attend school. Free choice is so ingrained in the
North American culture that many "don't know how we ever got
into a situation of telling parents where they have to send their
kids to school. In China, I can see, but not here."0 2 No bureaucrat controls the groceries we buy, or even where we buy the groceries. Consumers have the freedom to decide whether to shop at
an up-scale market that offers specialty items and bags groceries,
or a warehouse store that offers discounts and requires shoppers
to bag their own groceries. Thus, consumers are free to

199. Id.
200. Thomas H. Peeler & Patricia A. Parham, A Public-Private Partnership:
South Pointe Elementary School of Dade County, Florida, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES 203 (Simon
Hakim et al. eds., 1994).
201. See infra notes 271-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the details
of the School Choice Proposal.
202. Beers & Ellig, supra note 64, at 21 (quoting Lamar Alexander, former Secretary of Education).
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choose.2" 3
Moreover, the federal government has historically relied on
the principles underlying a voucher system to more efficiently
accomplish welfare objectives. For example, when a segment of
our society cannot afford to eat, the government intervenes to
provide demand-side assistance (e.g., the federal food stamp program). The government does not, however, totally usurp control of
food distribution merely because the market fails to provide for a
small segment of society. Another well-established voucher program is the federal government's voucher program for low-income
housing.2 °4 Most agree that the housing voucher is, by far, a better means of providing shelter to the less fortunate than housing
projects owned and operated by the federal government.0 s
Accordingly, private enterprise and consumer choice should
displace the public school monopoly in providing elementary and
secondary education. Generally, this system exists in the delivery
of higher education. 2 6 No bureaucrat dictates if, or where, students will receive a college education. Although each state owns
and operates several outstanding universities, consumer choice
ensures that colleges compete for students on the quality of education delivered. °7 Why, then, do we continue to provide something so important in a system that has proven to be a failure?
Moreover, why is there so much opposition to providing lowerlevel education in a system that has proven to be a success?
1. The Valuable Social Tool Argument
According to the education establishment, the public school
system "is the most valuable social tool [available] to provide a
common vision and shared experience."2 °5 Combining students
from different socio-economic, racial and ethnic backgrounds creates a melting pot reflective of our greater society. 2°9 Accord-

203. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at ix-xii.
204. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633, 664 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
205. See Schill, supra note 107, at 878. See infra notes 371-81 and accompanying
text for a discussion of housing vouchers and the resulting benefits of higher quality available housing, lower cost program management and better racial integration.
206. Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges and Tuition Price-Fixing:An Antitrust Primer, 17 J.C. & U.L. 271, 296-99 (1991).
207. For a discussion of the proposition that educational quality is reflected by
the economic concept of utility, see infra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
208. Ralph J. Flynn, An Educator's Perspective: Anti-Choice, in PROCEEDINGS:
THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY/URBAN SCHOOLS NATIONAL

TASK FORCE: SCHOOL CHOICE 50 (Richard M. Bossone and Irwin H. Polishook eds.,
1992).
209. Id.

1995]

School Choice

ingly, the public school system melds different backgrounds and
serves to foster social harmony, while private schools threaten
this goal by fostering economic elitism and fracturing the social
fabric.21 ° Yet, although the goal of a heterogeneous student population may be laudable, the public school system fails to achieve
this aspiration. Because the public school system requires students to attend a school based on geographic boundaries, the demographics of school populations fail to reflect the general population.2" Particularly in large metropolitan areas, suburban
schools tend to be white and wealthy, while inner-city schools
primarily serve people of color.2" 2 Moreover, efforts to integrate
generally result in people of money leaving the system. 1 3 Thus,
in many cases, private schools may be a better means for achiev214
ing racial and economic class integration than public schools.
Related to the goal of attracting a diverse student body,
many also argue that the public school system is necessary in
order to unify American society around a common set of civic
virtues and moral values. 1 5 A common school system would
therefore lead to an "enlightened and uniform civic culture."2 1
Uniformity, however, is inimical to the tradition of our Republic
and the nature of American society. 1 7 Not surprisingly, the public school system's efforts to achieve that goal generate considerable controversy. 2" The tradition of America is based on the
principle of diversity-whether diversity of opinion, religion or
racial and ethnic background." 9 Attempts to impose a single set
of values and beliefs throughout the public school curriculum has
therefore led to sharp political conflicts.220 Many communities
have realized that creating a common curriculum cannot serve all
these contentious battles by creating
interests and have avoided
"milquetoast curricula." 221
The Clinton Administration's efforts to establish "national
standards" in history further illustrates the problem of political

210. Id.
211. Peyser, supra note 2, at 625.
212. Id. at 625-27. See also JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN
IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 55-56 (1991).
213. Peyser, supra note 2, at 624-26 (describing Boston public schools).
214. See Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: EducatingFor Citizenship,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 202-03 (1995); Deborah E. Beck, Note, Jenkins v. Missouri:
School Choice as a Method for Desegregatingan Inner-City School District, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 1029, 1047-57 (1993).
215. Peyser, supra note 2, at 623.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 624.
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institutions attempting to instill uniform values on the entire
body politic. 222 The American History Standards project became
a "jungle of runaway inclusiveness" and imposed on teachers and
textbook publishers a politically correct anti-Western revisionist
perspective of U.S. and World History.223 The project reflected
the current trend in curriculum manipulation that attempts to
substitute an alternative culture, adverse to the mainstream culture, under the guise of multiculturalism.2 24 Political opposition
to the project ran deep, and the standards were scuttled.225 Although instilling values in the curriculum is appropriate, attempting to establish uniform values among ninety percent of the student population, especially when those values and opinions only
reflect those of a fringe "educational elite,"226 blindly ignores the
diversity of Americans.
School choice would lead to a school system conducive to a
pluralist American society while achieving the goals of injecting
values and character into students. A pluralist system of schools
would more accurately reflect the diversity within our society
rather than the public school system's effort to impose a "common
understanding of the public good, based on a common curriculum
and a common education." 227 For example, although a voucher
would enable certain students to select schools on criteria other
than that traditionally included in the curriculum, a majority of
students would select schools based on majoritarian beliefs of
what the curriculum should include. Because majoritarian beliefs
on curriculum probably transcend socio-economic class, school
choice, by eliminating geographical boundaries, would also more
effectively lead to a student population which would consists of
students from diverse economic backgrounds unlike the current
system.228
Furthermore, students could have the flexibility to emphasize
fields of study such as math, science, literature or the arts that

222. McCarthy, Seneca Falls and History, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1994, at A6.
223. Id. The standards made "clear in remarkable degree to which the achievements of the West are minimized, in the politically loaded leading questions asked
of students, in the insistent emphasis on gender, race, and class oppression." Id.
For example, George Washington is not mentioned once as President, but Senator
McCarthy appears 19 times. Id.
224. Michael W. McConnell, Multiculturalism,Majoritarianism,and Educational
Choice: What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGIS.
F. 123, 124.
225. Senate Rescues History, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A18 (describing Senate Resolution, passed by a vote of 99 to 1, condemning the standards).
226. McConnell, supra note 224, at 125.
227. Id. at 134.
228. See William Mullen, Faith, Hope, and Scholarship, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12,
1995, Magazine, at 12 (describing inner-city college preparatory school that attracts students from inner-city as well as wealthy Chicago suburbs).
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the common school system currently denies with its "one size fits
all curriculum."229 To ensure quality, however, schools must continue to meet accreditation standards.2 3 ° Meeting these standards would diminish the fears that students will not learn important substantive subject areas.2 3' Moreover, parents envisioning
a standard college preparatory curriculum will refrain from selecting schools that neglect to educate their child effectively in all
areas, regardless of a special expertise in one particular subject.232
Advocates of the existing system argue that niche schools
develop values contrary to the public good and will eventually
disunify American society.233 The school choice proposal may
lead to a diverse array of religious schools that would instill the
principles of those particular sects (e.g., Islam, Judaism, Mormon
or Catholicism). 23 Other niche schools may also emerge and instill values along ethnic, racial or cultural lines, such as the emergence of Afrocentric schools.235
Michael McConnell persuasively rebuts the concern that
those types of schools will disunify American society by
analogizing similar arguments made concerning the religion clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.23 6 By preventing the government from establishing a common religion, the
founders embarked on a radical experiment never undertaken by
any other nation-"we would not have a common civic culture at
the most fundamental level." 237 America was rewarded for the
risk of leaving the propagation of moral values to private
institutions. 238 Thus, America is not marked by serious religious
divisiveness and religion is apparently more influential in America than nations of Western Europe.239 More important, the
failure to establish one common religion has not yet disunified
American society. 2 °

229. Peggy S. Bittick, Equality and Excellence: Equal Education Opportunity for

Gifted and Talented Children, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 119, 127 (1995) (commenting that
the "one size fits all curriculum" is usually tailored for students who achieve at the
middle of the class or at the lowest level).
230. Greg D. Andres, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U.

CHI. L. REV. 795, 812 (1995).
231. Id.
232. Daniel, supra note 30, at 34.
233. McConnell, supra note 224, at 128.
234. Id. at 127.
235. See id.
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2. The Public Good Argument

According to the principles of a free market, if sufficient demand exists for a product or service, then profit-seeking entrepreneurs will provide that product or service at an efficient price.241
A purist would further argue that if a product or service is unavailable in the marketplace through voluntary action, then external forces should not compel its provision involuntarily. 242 Compelling involuntary provision reduces aggregate social wealth.2
Competing rationales, nonetheless, claim that instances exist
where a product or service should exist, but the market, when
undisturbed, fails to make it exist or continue to exist. 2" These

instances of "market failure" caused by excessive competition,
natural monopoly, scarcity of resources or problems of collective
action explain government intervention in several areas of commerce including electric utilities, railroads and broadcast communications to name a few.245
No one seriously questions that schools would exist absent
government intervention.2 " Parents would dedicate at least
some portion of the taxes currently collected by the government to
educate their children.2 47 For instance, prior to establishing the
federally subsidized student loan program, parents sacrificed
current consumption expenditures to send their children to college. 2 " Moreover, historical evidence indicates that a vibrant
lower-level education marketplace existed for more than 200 years
before the large-scale government intervention. 249 Instead, the
education establishment argues that the private market will provide an insufficient amount of "quality" education. 2 " This
proposition is dubious at best.
Education constitutes a classic example of a good that provides external benefits. Benefits inure to the public-at-large, not
merely the individual consumer, when an individual consumes
education. 251 Therefore, education is a common example of a

241. See generally Paula M. Taffe, Imputing the Wealth Maximization Principle
to State Legislators, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 311, 312-14 (1987) (discussing Judge
Posner's economic analysis of wealth maximization as a concept of efficiency).
242. Id. at 314.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Beers & Ellig, supra note 64, at 25-27.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. But see supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text describing the deterioration in the quality of lower level education.
251. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 595-608.
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"public good."" 2 Examples of external benefits that the public
derives from educated persons include more productive employees,
informed voters, and lower crime due to the increased opportunity
cost of committing a crime. 3
When the public-at-large receives external benefits from
another person's education, they become "free riders."2" Because
free riders benefit from the education of others, they, theoretically,
should, as a class, voluntarily cooperate to bear the cost of educating others.255 Yet, individual free riders have a natural incentive
to understate the benefit they receive, and attempt to minimize
their share of the burden.256 Collectively, providing that good
will become difficult as each free rider attempts to make others
subsidize the cost of education, while continuing to enjoy the benefits.257 Without government intervention, free riders would contribute nothing and each student would have to pay the full cost
of his or her education.25 This situation results in an inefficiently low level of output.259 Education would be under-produced because additional education that would yield marginal
benefits to the public would exceed the individual's marginal cost
and therefore would not be consumed.26 ° Accordingly, the public
school system was established to capture these purported additional benefits.2 6'
The existence of external benefits in education may justify
subsidization, but not government provision. When government
provision results in inefficient expenditure, the marginal cost of
providing education likely exceeds the inherently non-quantifiable
external benefits of education.262 In addition, and contrary to
the intention of obtaining an efficient consumption of education,
government provision of education through a monopolistic structure actually results in less education consumed than in a private
system with subsidized demand.263 If few alternatives exist to
supplement public school education other than an alternative
private school, a child may consume less education than the

252. Id. at 595-97.

253. Porter & Davis, supra note 18, at 400-01.
254. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 608.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 595-608.
257. See Beers & Ellig, supra note 64, at 22. See also BROWNING & BROWNING,
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amount a parent otherwise would be willing to purchase.2 For
example, if parents desire $1,200 worth of education for their
child, but the public school only provides $1,000 worth of education (i.e., for "free"), the parent must then pay $1,200 at a private
school to obtain the incremental amount desired (i.e., $200
worth).26 It is unlikely, however, that parents will obtain the
additional $200 worth of education they desire and would otherwise purchase.
Moreover, voluntary exchange would more efficiently capture
the purported external benefits that education provides.266 Presumably, parents would prioritize education expenditures for their
children and at least dedicate the amount they currently pay in
taxes toward education.267 In addition, private schools educate
children at a substantially lower cost than public schools, which
indicates that a large number of parents could afford to educate
their children if relieved of the lifetime tax burden of supporting
public education. 261 In fact, despite the double tax, low-income
parents in Chicago, a city with notoriously poor inner-city schools,
manage to send their children to private schools charging tuition
from $870 to $3,000 per year.2 69 In addition, private schools,
charities and religious organizations have traditionally offered
scholarships to low-income students based on academic merit.
That a substantial number of children would continue to receive
an education, and that those with academic merit lacking economic means would be subsidized by private organizations (i.e., themselves subsidized by the government through non-payment of
taxes), suggests that voluntary action closely achieves an optimal
societal output of education.
C. The School Choice Proposal
A completely privatized system, absent any public assistance,

264. Id. at 111.
265. Id.
266. Historical evidence indicates widespread schooling in the 19th century prior
to the monopolization of lower level education by public schools. See Beers & Ellig,
supra note 64, at 27.
267. Annual per pupil expenditures are substantially higher than each parent's
annual individual contribution because a large number of taxpayers do not presently use the public school system. A better proxy to calculate the amount that
each parent would spend per year to be indifferent between a taxpayer financed
system and a private system would calculate the present value of all taxes that a
parent will not pay before and after their children have attended and completed
school, and allocate this additional amount to each year that the parents pay for
their child's tuition without government subsidization.
268. Beers & Ellig, supra note 64, at 30.
269. Id.
270. See Mullen, supra note 228, at 14-16.
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would exclude certain members of society from receiving an education. That prospect offends an important egalitarian notion in
America that each person should at least have the opportunity to
succeed."' Thus, denying education would relegate children to a
low-income status because education generally dictates a person's
standard of living. 2 Moreover, external benefits derived from
education, although difficult to quantify, arguably exist. 3 For
example, public investment in education indirectly results in reduced welfare support and fewer criminal trials.274 As such, the
School Choice Proposal does not challenge the notion that public
investment in education should continue.
Instead, the School Choice Proposal merely contends that the
recipient of public investment should change from the producer
(i.e., the public school system) to the consumer (i.e., parents with
school-age children). In that regard, the School Choice Proposal
seeks to establish a voucher system. Several states have already
considered or adopted, although in limited fashion, a voucher
system which offers scholarships to low-income students. 5 This
Article, however, advocates that states should establish a voucher
that would be available to all students and redeemable at any
private school.
Various considerations would impact determining the amount
of the voucher. At a minimum, however, the amount of the voucher must allow parents to select from a variety of private schools.
Initially, the state would maintain its present level of expenditure
on education.27 ' The recipient of those funds, however, would
change. Instead of blindly giving the money to state-owned schools
(producer subsidies), parents with school-age children would receive it (consumer subsidies). Consequently, the money would go
to those schools that the parents deem would best educate their
child. Importantly, and contrary to the rhetoric against school
choice, the voucher plan does not foretell whether some members
of society will not receive an education. School choice simply rationalizes the market landscape in which education is provided.
The School Choice Proposal includes religious schools, assuming the proposal passes constitutional muster, as an important
mechanism to ensure an immediate critical mass of competition in

271. Kenneth L. Karst, Essay, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 371 (1986).
272. David M. Nelson & Robert T. Patton, Measuring Earnings Growth in the
U.S., 3-DEC J. LEGAL ECON. 11, 13-17 (1993).
273. Porter & Davis, supra note 18, at 400-01.
274. Id.
275. See infra notes 627-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prevalence of school choice programs today.
276. Real expenditures, however, could decline in the future as a competitive
market eliminates the substantial waste in resources that presently exists.
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the education market. Religious schools should not be excluded
due to a fear of public money supporting religion. That statement,
often made by members of the education establishment with a
vested interest in the status quo,277 mistakenly perceives the
purpose of the voucher. The purpose of the voucher plan is not to
support or advocate religion, but to improve education. Moreover,
taxpayers presently support a public school system that imparts
values contrary, sometimes offensive, to their own beliefs.27 s
Furthermore, in certain instances, the public school even indoctrinates children into a way of thinking, differing only in name from
religion.279
1. EliminatingProducerSubsidies Leads to Competing Private
Sector Producers

The debate concerning school reform must resolve the fundamental question of whether production will occur through the
present public sector monopoly or through competing private sector suppliers.28 ° Microeconomic theory can explain the consequences of adopting either system, but is unable to decide which
is the "better" system.28 1 So far, this Article has used the term
"monopoly" to describe the present system, and has alluded to the
competitive market that the School Choice Proposal would create.
Unquestionably, however, the School Choice Proposal will not
result in meeting the strict parameters of a "perfectly competitive"
market, in the same way that the current system is not a pure
monopoly.28 2 These general descriptive terms, nonetheless, appropriately characterize the market structure of each alternative.
The public school system operates as a de facto monopolist
because substantial state subsidies to the public school system
allow public schools to predate the emergence of meaningful competition. 283 Thus, students face a sole provider of education and
generally cannot attend any school other than the school assigned
to them based on their geographical location. 2s' Although the
School Choice Proposal would not lead to a "perfectly competitive"

277. FLIEGEL & MAcGUIRE, supra note 83, at 192 (discussing bureaucrat's interest in preserving the bureaucracy).
278. See generally Terri Jane Lavi, Free Exercise Challenges to Public School
Curricula:Are States Creating 'Enclaves of Totalitarianism'Through Compulsory
Reading Requirements?, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 301 (1988).
279. Id.
280. See generally Solomon, supra note 34, at 883.
281. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 349-57, 364-66 (comparing conditions in a perfectly competitive market to conditions in a monopolistic market).
282. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the characteristics of perfectly competitive markets and monopolistic markets.
283. Porter & Davis, supra note 18, at 412-13.
284. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 251-53.
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market, few industries operate under such restriction. Instead, the
competitive model simply explains the market consequences of
multiple suppliers who provide a similar good to many customers
with adequate information.8 5
Perhaps the best-known conclusion of microeconomic theory
is that, for the same level of demand and cost conditions, the
prevailing price will be higher and prevailing output lower in a
monopolistic market than in a competitive market.28 Providing
lower-level education through a monopoly structure leads to paying more for less education.287 Substantially lower private school
tuition compared to the public cost per student, and the correspondingly higher scores on standardized tests of private school
students, illustrates that phenomenon.288 Moreover, the output
level in a monopoly is "allocatively inefficient" because consumers
value additional units of education more than the cost to produce
those units in a competitive market.289 This inefficiency leads to
the "deadweight" societal loss resulting from monopolization of a
market.290
Monopoly further leads to a redistribution of income from
consumers (i.e., parents, students and taxpayers) to producers
(i.e., the education establishment). 291 Higher teacher salaries
and a bloated bureaucracy in the public school system reflect this
redistribution. 292 These descriptions are hardly debatable. To
justify the present market framework, policy-makers must therefore determine that other benefits, derived only when a government monopoly provides education, exceed these welfare losses.
In instances of natural monopoly, one producer may meet the
entire demand of the market most efficiently because of a declining marginal cost over the relevant range of production.2 93 In
such cases, for example, electrical power production under certain
market conditions, governmental intervention occurs to regulate
prices and avoid the deadweight societal loss that results from
monopoly pricing.294 Once concluding that a market lends itself
to natural monopoly, regulators will prevent further entry by com-

285. See generally id. at 595-608.
286. Id. at 349-50.
287. Id. at 350.
288. See Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 4.
289. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text discussing that the lack of
available supplements to public education results in less education consumed than
otherwise in a competitive market.
290. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 350.
291. Id. at 351-53.
292. Solomon, supra note 34, at 895-96.
293. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 369-71.
294. Id. at 371-74.
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peting firms to avoid excessive, or "wasteful," competition.29 5
Regulators and the producer thus enter a "regulatory bargain"
providing an exclusive operating license to the producer in exchange for regulated pricing.2 96
Although the market cost structure may initially have created the natural monopoly and prevented entry by competitors,
eventually the exclusive operating license may constitute the
greatest barrier to entry.297 A "scheme of comprehensive nonregulation" would be preferable because no artificial barriers to
entry would be created to perpetuate monopoly after the market
ceased to be monopolistic.298 Under such a scheme, natural monopolies would emerge and extract rents, but new entrants or the
threat of prospective entrants would "check" monopoly pricing. 219 Innovation, substitute goods and the natural life cycle of
the market, however, eventually will lead to competitive pric* 300
ing.
The market for lower-level education does not exhibit natural
monopoly characteristics. °1 A legislative scheme designed to result in production dominated by a single producer through exclusive subsidies to public schools is therefore unjustified by market
conditions. Size may offer economies of scale and scope, as in any
industry, but production costs do not decline over all ranges of
production for the provision of education. °2 Multiple suppliers
would exist but for the state's decision to subsidize all the production costs of one producer.3 °3 Presently, the state's de facto exclusive operating license to the public school system has created
an artificial barrier to entry that perpetuates a monopoly when
the market is inefficiently structured as such."'
The education system allows public schools to engage in predatory pricing to maintain their monopoly position.3 5 Although a
private school may offer a superior product, parents/children derive greater overall utility from receiving a sub-standard education for free. The legislative scheme thereby artificially denies

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548, 611-15 (1969).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Porter & Davis, supra note 18, at 412-13.
304. Id.
305. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 205-07. Predatory pricing is
selling goods or services at low prices for the purpose of eliminating competition.
Id. at 205.
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welfare maximization and public schools survive only as a result
of the legal framework allowing predatory pricing." 6 If public
schools competed on terms of product quality, but producer subsidies provided only modest price advantages, these schools presumably would lose a substantial number of students to private
schools and probably reflect the market landscape of higher education. If the schools competed on terms of price and quality, (i.e.,
charging consumers the full cost of the bloated bureaucracy by
eliminating all producer subsidies), these schools almost assuredly
would fail. Yet, this failing system is the system that the education establishment fights to preserve.
The poor quality of public schools inevitably results in people
of money electing to "bypass" the system. Those who bypass the
public school system in favor of private education obviously perceive that a private school offers a superior education opportunity."0 7 Bypass typically is a function of the availability of product
substitutes.0 Private schools obviously present a substitute to
public schools, but those substitutes are only available to moderately high income families with the means to afford private tuition." 9 As such, people of money bypass the public school system. Unfortunately, people lacking the economic means cannot
bypass.
The School Choice Proposal provides the economic means of
bypass to everyone. As such, academic aptitude or field of study
can determine where a child attends school. That aspect of the
School Choice Proposal sparks considerable controversy from the
education establishment, which claims that academic talent will
flee and leave the "dregs" behind in one school.310 In other
words, private schools will "cream skim" the academic talent currently attending public schools.3" ' In the context of students, the
"cream" is not merely those with high test scores. Instead, it is
any student who bears an intangible cost to receive an education
in the public school that would be missing at an alternative
school. Or, in other words, any student who, for whatever reason,
perceives a superior opportunity for education at an alternative
school, but is unable to attend that school due to the tuition. This
abstract concept of intangible cost may result from a number of
factors such as the uniform curriculum that neglects to serve a
student's particular field of interest, or the prospect that a private
school will offer a safer environment.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Porter & Davis, supra note 18, at 412-13.
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The education establishment's arguments against "creamskimming" are no different than those of other legislated monopolists who attempt to preserve their franchise. "Cream-skimming"
often results in regulated markets where a monopolist with a
universal access mandate cross-subsidizes customers who cannot
afford to pay the marginal cost of service by charging higher rates
3 12
to a "creamy" (i.e., high revenue and low cost) customer class.
When a competitor enters to target the "cream," as would a substantial number of private schools as a result of the School Choice
Proposal, the monopolist will attempt to restrict entry into the
market.1 3
AT&T, for example, attempted to stop MCI from offering
long-distance telephone service at rates twenty to fifty percent
below those of AT&T,3 14 arguing that higher long-distance rates
subsidized local service rates below the cost of service. Although
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) originally barred
MCI from the long-distance market to preserve AT&T's monopoly,
later, after the D.C. Circuit determined that the FCC exceeded its
authority, the FCC permitted MCI's entry on the ground that the
overall benefits of competition exceed the subjective benefit from
an "equitable" rate to low volume, high cost, users. 31 5 Moreover,
the FCC correctly held that such cross-subsidization is inconsistent with the public interest.316 In similar fashion, the education
establishment fears school vouchers for the same self-interested
reason that AT&T feared MCI - competition will result in a loss
of market share and the advantages inuring from a monopoly
position.
When regulated monopolists fail in barring the entry of competition, such as AT&T in the MCI case, the next strategy is to
bar customers from opting out of the common system. For example, electric utilities customarily subsidize residential users by
charging lower costing industrial customers rates higher than
their marginal cost.317 In New York City, several industrial customers responded by constructing their own electric generators to
supply energy at a lower cost than the common system
charged.1 8 To prevent exit (i.e., opting out of the common sys-

312. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 387-88.
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tem), a monopolist will argue that the customer has an affirmative duty to subsidize other customers as well as the monopolist,
and cannot leave the common system.319 In 1988, for example,
National Steel, similar to the industrial customers in New York
City, bypassed the inflated rates charged by a monopolistic local
natural gas distribution company, and built its own connection to
an interstate gas pipeline.32 ° The Michigan Public Utility Commission sought, unsuccessfully, to bar National Steel from exiting. 3 Likewise, the education establishment, if vouchers are
adopted, seeks to limit the number of vouchers available to restrict customer bypass.322 Although the rhetoric is phrased to
suggest a concern for students, the actions are designed merely to
protect the franchise.
The question therefore becomes whether unrestricted "creamskimming" is desirable, or whether our policy should confine those
who wish to exit with a social obligation to cross-subsidize others.
The economic analysis favors unfettered "cream-skimming" under
the same principles that indicate the superiority of a competitive
market to allocate resources.323 Yet, for policy-makers, non-economic considerations of "fairness" may outweigh the greater aggregate benefits society derives from competition.
The School Choice Proposal, (i.e., unrestricted "cream-skimming"), will not increase the number of students denied a
meaningful education. The education establishment's fear that
school choice will leave students behind sounds hollow in light of
the failure of the present system. This system cannot get much
worse.
For example, sixty percent of public high school students
failed a high school proficiency test in Jersey City, New Jersey,
despite spending $9,000 per student in the public school system.324 Additionally, twenty-five percent of the nation's high
school students quit school before graduating with that percentage
approaching fifty percent in large cities.325 Moreover, the current system suffers from severe truancy and absenteeism, and the

319. Id.
320. See Note, Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency in FederalEnergy Statutes,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1314-17 (1990).
321. See Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 887 F.2d 1295,
1298 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1079 (1990).
322. Cynthia Bright, The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers: Private
Choice and Proposition 174, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 193, 196 n.22 (1995) (comparing
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program which limits student participation in the
voucher program with California Proposition 174 which proposed to allow unlimited participation in the voucher program).
323. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 578-87.
324. Whitman's Choice, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1995, at A20.
325. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at ix.
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performance of the inner-city poor is substantially lower than the
neighboring suburban and national averages. 26 There is no system that will produce perfect results. America can strive only for
a system that, after close scrutiny, works better than any other
alternative. More money placed into the current system will not
work to improve the education that "marginalized" students receive because the current system does not work. 27 Even if the
School Choice Proposal leads to schools of "dregs" that could not
or did not try to gain admittance to other schools, those schools
will be no worse off than many schools in the present system.
Moreover, concentrating on underachieving and unmotivated
students in one location may be desirable to openly direct attention to those most in need.
More likely, the School Choice Proposal will improve the
overall quality of education that schools provide, and reduce the
number of students that the present system is guilty of leaving
behind. The current system must accept responsibility for creating
a present class of "dregs" by imposing a common curriculum on all
students, notwithstanding special talents or interests. School
choice will lead to a pluralist school system,32 s creating opportunities for these students to enroll in special schools and develop
those traits. Moreover, when a parent and child choose their
school, instead of a bureaucrat dictating which school that child
will attend, they create a vested interest in that school which
instills in the student a purpose for attending that school. 29
This intangible quality produces an observable improvement in
the overall school climate, a critical indicator of school
quality 33 °
2. The Case for a Competitive Marketplace in Lower Education
The School Choice Proposal will convert the market structure
from a monopoly to a competitive market by eliminating exclusive
subsidies to single producers. Instead, each consumer will receive
the subsidy, and independently select their school of choice.
Schools will therefore compete for students on terms of quality
and, depending on the voucher amount, price. A competitive market will lead to a greater amount of education 331 at a lower cost,

326. Id.
327. Solomon, supra note 34, at 887 n.16 (noting that up to 50% of public school
education expenditures goes toward non-education related administrative costs).
328. CHARLES L. GLENN, CHOICE OF SCHOOLS IN Six NATIONS ix (1989).

329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Quantity of education refers to the utility derived from receiving education.
Utility is a subjective measure of usefulness that results from consuming education. See BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 58. For purposes of this Arti-
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thereby eliminating the deadweight societal loss332 that results
from the public school monopoly. Furthermore, because a monopolist can pass on increased costs to the consumer while competitive
firms must bear these costs, consumers bear the risk of mistake
by monopolists whereas the producer bears such a risk in a competitive market.
To illustrate, when the school board decides the curriculum
for all schools in the district, consumers bear the risk that the
curriculum inadequately educates children in particular areas. If
a school in a competitive market establishes an inappropriate
education plan, parents will remove their children and send them
to other schools. The risk of mistake falls on the producer. A competitive industry thus creates appropriate incentives (i.e., the loss
of economic livelihood or the potential for extraordinary gain) to
avoid making mistakes, or immediately correcting these once they
become apparent.
Superficially, one could conclude that schools in a competitive
market will fail to take beneficial risks. On the contrary, however,
a shocking disparity exists between the rate that private actors in
the "adapt or die" environment of a competitive market innovate
and incorporate technological change, and the rate of politically or
ideologically influenced actors operating in an "if adapt, then die"
environment. Political institutions stifle the rate of innovation by
imposing multiple layers of review and approval before implementation, and not offering, individual rewards for innovating.3 33 In
addition, factionalism among competing interest groups, as a result of the nuisance democratic decision-making imposes, inevitably results in diluting new proposals.334 Yet, even more disturbing, administrators and unions seek to dilute new proposals, or
hinder their implementation, often as a means to ensure the failure of new proposals disadvantageous to their constituents, such
as increasing class sizes, hiring teachers with less credentials, or
providing teachers greater autonomy.335
Conversely, competing private-sector firms must attract consumers according to the merits that their products offer. Consumers will not choose product A, when product B is better at a lower
cost.336 A marketplace with competing private firms therefore
creates tremendous pressure on these producers to offer features

cle, we can assume utility encompasses an objective notion of quantity and a subjective notion of quality.
332. Id. at 351.
333. Porter & Davis, supra note 18, at 416.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 9-11.
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that other products fail to offer.337 Human nature, combined
with the opportunity to keep the profit from your efforts, acts as
an extraordinary stimulant in a competitive marketplace. The
communications industry aptly illustrates the public sector's inability to match the rapid pace of innovation that occurs among
private firms.3 38 Congress and the FCC have attempted to regulate mass communications, beginning with the rationale that
scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum would unduly impair access to broadcasting media.339 Thus, radio and television licenses came with the heavy price of regulation probably not tolerated
by other industries.3 °
Technology arising in the private sector arose to circumvent
burdensome broadcast regulations beginning in the 1960s with
community antenna television (CATV).34' In 1984 and 1992,
Congress, in its continuing effort to maintain federal oversight
over all mass media communications, even those that no longer
involved the electromagnetic spectrum, imposed substantial barriers on the convergence of broadcast, cable and telephonic technologies.342 Yet, while Congress and the FCC were thinking in cable,
the private sector had already "eclipsed the fixed star of federal
communications law" and dove into satellite and telephonic services that avoid the consequences of onerous regulation. 343 The rate
of innovation and the ability to adapt to new market conditions of
private actors consistently exceeds the rate that politically influenced actors respond.3 This phenomenon would exist in lowerlevel education but for the present market structure, the public
school monopoly.

337. Id. at 400-01 (discussing the concept of product differentiation).
338. Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis
of Law in a New Key 17 (Apr. 15, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author and with The John MarshallLaw Review).
339. See id.
340. See id. For example, unlike newspapers, broadcasters were required to allow access to speakers with alternative viewpoints. Id. (comparing FCC fairness
doctrine with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), that
struck down a comparable requirement for newspapers). In addition, race-based
preferences upheld in awarding broadcast licenses are unconstitutional in other
contexts. Id. The FCC has "erected a gargantuan body of laws that restricts entry
at every level of the radio and television industries." Id.
341. Id. at 17-18. The Supreme Court nonetheless extended FCC jurisdiction to
CATV. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 163 (1968).
342. Chen & Gifford, supra note 338, at 18. See also Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1988));
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (Supp. IV 1992)).
343. See Chen & Gifford, supra note 338, at 18.
344. Id.
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For the benefits attributable to a competitive market to materialize, the School Choice Proposal cannot be diluted by barriers
that inhibit competition. Two critical aspects will be a large number of suppliers (e.g., critical mass) and mobility of resources. The
education establishment has strategically targeted these two aspects to dilute the efficacy of school choice proposals. For example,
the argument to exclude religious schools from a voucher plan is
really an effort to diminish the supply of competing institutions,
thus making school choice exist only in theory and not in practice.3 Moreover, the education establishment may attempt to
prevent resources from entering the education market by creating
unnecessarily stringent accreditation standards in order to participate in a voucher program. A critical mass of suppliers, however,
is critical to establish the competitive trait of price-taking.346
Price-taking is where the price of a good or service becomes market determined because an individual school cannot affect the
overall price. 347 To illustrate, if school A decides to increase its
tuition, a sufficient number of alternative schools (i.e., schools B
through Z) exist to absorb market demands such that school A
cannot increase its price without losing all of its students.3"
Price-taking does not suggest, however, that all schools will
charge the same tuition because education is not a fungible good.
Schools will compete on non-price terms, (e.g., athletic programs,
math proficiency and theater departments) that consumers will
individually value in their selection decision. Yet, no school can
obtain an excess profit in the long run because consumers could
choose an alternative school willing to provide the same curriculum for less tuition, or substitute an aspect of the school's curriculum (e.g., an intramural athletic program rather than inter-varsity competition) for less tuition. Because of the importance of a
critical mass of supply, the School Choice Proposal includes religious schools and requires open public school enrollment.
Mobility of resources is another critical aspect of establishing
a competitive market in education. This concept primarily applies
to eliminating artificial impediments that prevent competitors
from entering a market.349 Substantial barriers to entry is a
critical aspect of maintaining a monopoly. 50 Unnecessarily
stringent school accreditation standards would constitute an arti-
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ficial barrier for new supply to enter the market.3 5' Most would
agree that some minimum level of standards should exist to ensure that schools are bona fide educational institutions. 352 Yet,
using standards to frustrate the creation of new supply would
impede establishing a competitive market.35 ' Accreditation
should therefore depend on broader performance criteria (e.g.,
scores on standardized tests) rather than on adhering to a strict
set of conditions." Moreover, express limitations on the creation of new supply, such as the limits placed on the number of
charter schools in California,"'5 must not occur either.
Competition and consumer choice has produced a "first class"
university system in America that exports a substantial number
of degrees to foreign students.3 56 The federal student loan program for higher education operates under principles similar to the
voucher proposal. 57 Without demand subsidized by the federal
government, many students arguably could only choose state
institutions offering reduced tuition through production subsidies.35 Consumer choice, made possible by demand subsidies,
has powerfully affected the curriculum of universities, and led to a
diverse array of schools. 359 David Riesman's work for the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education notes that:
American post-secondary education is extraordinarily diverse in
terms of institutions [(e.g., two year, four year, community colleges
and religious colleges)] and even more so in terms of programs and
enclaves within institutions [observing emergence of women's studies, Third World studies, and other curriculum
changes resulting
36 0
from consumer, (e.g., student, pressure)].
Colleges develop "marketing strategies" that identify the distinctive segment of students currently served by the college, whether
the college is adequately serving these students and whether that
segment presents a viable long term program.36 ' These desirable
aspects of the market for higher education would emerge in the
market for lower education as a result of competition and consumer choice.
Although public universities compete with private institu-
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tions for students, public universities, in most instances, provide a
less desirable product.362 Without subsidized tuition, public institutions seemingly would not appeal to prospective students. Private colleges consistently dominate the top positions in academic
rankings.363 In addition, public universities are far less responsive to consumer demands for curriculum content.3 64 Public universities do not engage in the marketing plans to attract students
that Riesman described because, as of 1980, no public institution
had been closed (although some had been consolidated).365 Even
in a case where the president of a state university concluded that
the school was so ill-equipped to serve the wants and needs of its
students and, therefore, called on the legislature to close the
school, local legislators, at the behest of faculty
and local business
3 66
interests, managed to keep the school open.
The vast inefficiencies resulting from public provision of higher education has led one commentator to conclude that "no strong
philosophical or economic arguments ... favor ... publicly provided higher education."36 ' Instead, higher education should be privately provided, with public finance to individuals meeting subsidization criteria.36 The same problems with public provision
that these commentators document with public universities will
arise in lower-level public schools even with school choice. Directly
subsidizing a producer eliminates market constraints to control
costs, thereby leading to inefficient expenditure.3 69 Moreover,
production subsidies that allow lower tuition create artificial demand for the sub-standard education offered by public
schools.3 7 For that reason, lower level, as well as higher level,
education reform must envision a long-term strategy of transforming provision from the public sector to the private sector.
The advantages of accomplishing desirable social objectives
through the private sector, instead of the public sector, is aptly
illustrated by the federal government's experience in low-income
housing.'
The New Deal-era witnessed the entrance of the fed-

362. RIESMAN, supra note 357, at 106 (noting more stringent regulations concerning curriculum and admissions standards, a greater prevalence of collective bargaining and fewer incentives to develop innovative learning methods at public
universities).
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eral government into providing low-income housing.372 Presently, the government owns and operates 1.3 million units of public
housing.373 Beginning in the 1970s, however, the government
began to rely on the private sector to deliver housing assistance,
offering supply-side incentives 74 and demand-side assistance
with housing vouchers. 375 Numerous studies indicate substantial
cost savings, up to 112%, from using vouchers rather than government provision of housing. 376 The cost savings result from
subjecting private actors to market discipline, which lowers both
the cost of construction and administration.37 7 For example, illustrative of the interest group politics that inevitably affect political decision-making, the enabling legislation for public housing
construction became captured by powerful labor unions that prohibited competitive pricing for construction labor.37 Housing
vouchers, in addition to offering substantial savings, are also
heralded for offering tenants a choice in the type of housing and
geographical location, as well as encouraging landlords to maintain more desirable living conditions.379
While traditionally "liberal" groups advocate housing vouchers as a more effective means of providing low-income housing,
the same groups proclaim that education vouchers cannot work.
On the contrary, the same observed benefits of the housing
voucher scheme will result with school vouchers. Similar to public
education, public housing has been criticized for creating and
perpetuating racial segregation, while the housing voucher, as will
the education voucher, has had an integrating effect. s 0 Moreover, substantial cost savings from efficient expenditure will allow
children to receive more education at present expenditure levels.381
Efficient expenditure is fundamentally important because
education is an economic good. In other words, more education is
better than less because education is a desirable commodity in the

372. Id. at 894.
373. Id. at 897.
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view of consumers.382 Economic goods are scarce.383 Every society must determine how limited resources will be allocated among
the unlimited demand for them. The education establishment, and
the rhetoric concerning reform, often ignore that education confronts a scarcity of funding no different from other activities.38
An additional one million dollars of public funds dedicated to
education requires that one million dollars will not be spent on
roads, police, or other government functions.3 85 Should the government ignore the constraint and obtain the funding through
taxation, then taxpayers, as a class, will have one million dollars
less to spend on food, clothing or other goods. 38" The notion of
scarcity indicates the problem with inefficient expenditure. If
increased educational expenditures fail to yield increased academic performance, but instead expand bureaucracy, taxpayers would
prefer to retain their money. Education reform must begin with
the understanding that every dollar spent on education is a dollar
not spent on something else. Those that seek to maintain the
existing system must justify that, as a society, we place a higher
value on the unnecessary expenditures that fund a bloated bureaucracy than alternative uses.
Economic models explain that a competitive market structure
will allocate economic goods to result in more goods at a lower
price than a market dominated by a monopolist. 3 7 The School
Choice Proposal implicitly adopts allocative efficiency as a societal
goal, rather than the goal of distributional equity sought by the
present system. To crudely illustrate the difference, in a society of
ten persons, allocative efficiency seeks societal output of twelve
units, with each person receiving a varying amount, whereas
distributive equity favors ten units equally distributed. Controversial to those favoring distributional equity is the prospect of those
in the lowest stratum of an allocatively efficient system receiving
less than one unit of output; controversial to those favoring
allocative efficiency is the prospect of taking from those in the
high end of the spectrum to bolster those at the low end (i.e.,
redistribution) because this inevitably leads to lower overall production.3 88 Advocates typically assert either that a distributional
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equity system can achieve the same level of production as an
allocative efficiency system; or conversely, that an allocative efficiency system will outproduce a distributional equity system to
such an extent that the person receiving the least will, nonetheless, receive more than the pro rata portion received under a distributive equity system (i.e., the trickle down theory, or "the rising
tide will raise all boats" metaphor).389
Such arguments generally remain confined to theory and
rhetoric, and a perfect system of either does not exist for comparison. Yet, the seventy-two year experiment of the Soviet Union
and Eastern European economies premised on principles of
distributional equity generally provides powerful evidence of the
long term failure of such a system for allocating resources.39 °
Moreover, the United States has embraced, for more than 200
years, the concepts of free enterprise and competition, precepts of
allocative efficiency. The legal framework of the United States is
designed to advance allocative efficiency through antitrust laws,
the Dormant Commerce Clause and various other sources of law
that embrace and advance the principles of free trade and competition. 391 Deviations from such a system thus must overcome a
strong presumption against their efficacy.
The experiment in distributional equity of lower level education began in the 1930s, a period heavily influenced by worldwide
3 92
tendencies toward socialism and centralization of authority.
Ultimately, these systems failed.393 Many supporters of the present system, however, recognize the economic efficiency of a competitive market for lower level education, but justify maintaining
the present system on the ground that a universal education system, provided through a public school monopoly, is necessary to
"realize the promise of democracy and our commitment to justice
and equity."3 94 This response reflects a common mistake of assuming the necessity of the present system, rather than the necessity of education itself, in forging the success of America. The
universal access goal of public education promoted by local governments may have, at first, effectively organized an ad hoc rural
education system.' 95

389. Barnes, supra note 388, at 854-61.
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Today, however, America prospers despite the established
system. Tomorrow, however, is uncertain. When displacing public
provision is proposed, the education establishment strikes back
with the rallying call of "democracy."396 The democracy label is
effective rhetoric, because Americans comfortably take the existing system for granted.3 9v If the proper descriptive term of "socialist" was used to characterize the public education system for
allocating education,398 then perhaps the rhetoric of the education establishment would be less effective.399 The debate could
then proceed, as it should, according to whether the present system more effectively accomplishes the goal of educating children.
Those arguments would need to justify an "island of socialism in
[the] free market sea" of America due to a mistrust of voluntary
exchange to best allocate education.4 °° In that regard, Anders
Aslund, a leading advocate of swift privatization schemes in formerly communist countries, catalogued five principle reasons to
privatize socialist economies that apply, in startling similarity, to
America's public education system.40 '
First, privatization creates a boundary between economics
and politics.40 2 Industrial firms should be judged by economic
performance, not political considerations.4 3 Similarly, schools
should survive or fail according to their academic performance.
Accordingly, a school should expire if its students score lower on
standardized tests or are not admitted to desirable colleges.
Second, privatization is necessary to make firms economically
independent and exposed to financial discipline.4 4 Economic independence creates an appropriate incentive system.4 5 State
owned firms do not bear the consequences of money-losing investments, and therefore unduly undertake projects or activities that
do not enhance wealth or profitability.4 6 Public schools also do
not adequately bear the risk of their decisions. Public schools do
not lose students when curriculum decisions fail to enhance aca-
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demic performance. ° v For public schools, revenue is obtained in
the competitive enterprise of extracting from the public fisc.40 8
As the state funds public education, or any activity, the state creates a class of persons dependent on future funding. Therefore,
these persons become highly involved in the political decisionmaking that appropriates funding.4 9 In other words, the public
officials can buy political patronage by funding the state education
system.
Third, privatization ensures a competitive market.410 Markets without competition are subject to complacency, and maintain the status quo.4 Competition leads to economic growth,
innovation, and product quality improvements to attract consumers. The absence of competition in the public school system, similarly, is responsible for the declines in student achievement.
Fourth, a subsidiary of the third rationale, private ownership
leads to "creative destruction" through entrepreneurship and innovation.412 In the United States's manufacturing sector, 11% of
manufacturing jobs are lost and replaced each year, compared to
.5% in the former USSR.4 13 Centralized management in the public school system has similarly deterred developing innovative
pedagogical methods or experimental programs that lead to improved student performance.4 4 The decision to innovate in public schools is made at the state or federal level, not at the school
level. Because individual teachers or principals receive little, or
no, direct reward from innovation, few experiments are developed
to target specific students or classroom situations. Moreover, the
bureaucratic structure establishes a burdensome process of submitting proposals, seeking various approvals, and then alteration
to reflect the political reaction of community groups, teacher's
groups and civil rights groups.4 15
Fifth, a socialist economy does not invest capital on a rational
basis. 1 6 Instead, political factors dictate the beneficiaries of investment.4 17 As such, the formerly communist economies had obsolete fixed assets despite high rates of investment.418 Investment in public education has doubled, while academic perfor-
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mance has declined.419 Certainly academic performance and investment should be positively correlated.42 ° Yet, an inverse relationship between educational expenditures and academic performance reflects that the public school system similarly misapplies
investment capital.42 '
Aslund concludes that privatization should proceed swiftly,
rather than gradually, to eliminate the stifling effect of monopolization on the emergence of private sector suppliers, the continued
waste of social resources in obsolete enterprises, and to ensure a
critical mass of competing firms.422 The gradual privatization
approach of Hungary (unsuccessful) compared to the swift approach of the Czech Republic (successful) supports Aslund's
thesis. 423 In that regard, privatization of the lower-level education marketplace, accomplished via the voucher, should occur
swiftly - the race to transform the lower level education market
to private sector production "belongs to the hare and not to the
tortoise."424 As such, efforts to limit vouchers by means-testing
or excluding religious schools from the voucher program represent
an overly cautious transition and will detrimentally affect the success of the School Choice Proposal.425
The United States seemingly taught the world the value of
free enterprise and competition, leading to the collapse of the
formerly communist economies. Ironically, America remains committed to a socialist model, and is the only major industrialized
country that does not widely embrace competition in its school
system.4 26 The teacher now must become the student. The Dutch
Constitution, for example, expressly guarantees citizens the freedom to use public funds to establish any school, independently
select a curriculum and appoint teachers with government oversight extending only to assure a minimum standard of quality.4 27 German private schools receive public subsidies to make
private education available to all children regardless of economic
means. 428 Japan instills competition by ranking schools according to the performance of their students on university entrance
exams. 429 Even more ironic, while these countries consistently
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outperform American students in international comparisons, each
spends less per pupil.430
Wholesale comparisons to the practices of the former Soviet
Union and other socialist countries as a paradigm of the public
school system, although analytically analogous and powerfully
prescriptive, fail to persuade the establishment of the need for
change because, according to the public school mantra, the system
must be "equitable."431 Equity seemingly would require that every child have an equal opportunity to receive a quality education.432 The government monopoly, however, has fostered "savage inequalities" in the delivery of education to the urban
poor. 433 This fostering leads the establishment to demand substantial amounts of money, poured into the existing system, to
remedy that inequality.4 34 That claim ignores substantial empirical evidence reflecting little, or no, correlation between educational expenditures in the present public education system and academic performance.4 35 Of every dollar given to the present system, at least thirty-three, and possibly fifty cents will be spent on
the administrative bureaucracy. 436 Little wonder that education
bureaucrats seek more money. Moreover, the present system
misallocates its resources, directing funds to areas that do not
result in improved student performance."
More important,
even if superficial "equity," reflected by the amount of money
spent in school districts, could be achieved, the present system
would continue to forsake other fundamental interests.
3. Liberty and Individual Responsibility
Professor John Coons has long advocated school choice with
no reference to the efficiency of establishing a competitive market
for education. 43" To Coons, "the fundamental argument[s] for
school choice ... are social." 439 The public school system that
seeks to remedy the "savage inequalities" is itself inimical to social justice. 44° All members of society should be equally free to

430. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 7. In 1985, the United States spent an
overall average of $3,310 per pupil, West Germany $2,253 and Japan $1,805. Id.
431. Porter & Davis, supra note 18, at 401-03.
432. Id.
433. See KOZOL, supra note 212, at 50-60.
434. Id.
435. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 31, at 102-04, 125-26.
436. See infra notes 594-600 and accompanying text describing the bureaucratic
structure of the public education system.
437. See Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 3-5 (noting that the United States
spends more on buildings and administration compared to Germany and Japan).
438. Coons, supra note 147, at 39.
439. Id.
440. Coons suggests that the present system of conscripting students to schools
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decide their destiny. The public school monopoly forsakes liberty,
for an illusory equity." 1 Yet, only a select few are vested with
the liberty of choice. The select few consists of those wealthy
enough to afford the double tax of private education or to establish richly endowed suburban schools." 2 Nevertheless, denying
liberty of choice to others by conscripting children of the urban
poor does not create equity. This "equity" of the public school
system engenders hostility toward the political system that dictates to lower income families that they are incapable of determining the fate of their children.'
Equity only will exist if a
system grants all parents and children the liberty of choice. Thus,
society must respect the dignity and the responsibility of parents
and children to choose.
Professor Suzanna Sherry contends that society not only
must respect the responsibility of parents to choose, but presume
that parents will behave responsibly.'
According to Professor
Sherry, an essential goal of education is to inculcate specific values of cultural literacy, critical thinking and moral character." 5
The failure of the present education system in accomplishing this
objective risks losing America's heritage of responsible republican
citizenship." 6 A voucher system is therefore desirable, notwithstanding the other arguments based on economic efficiency or
liberty, but instead because it will instill "responsible citizenship
and reinvigorat[e] the lost assumption of individual responsibility."447

The education establishment claims that, with increased
funding, they can provide better education. Who do parents trust
with the money? Do they trust the education bureaucrats who

leads to the following eight maladies: 1) blacks are assigned to all-black schools; 2)
the poor go to school with the poor, thereby reinforcing the cycle of poverty; 3)
teachers can never become true professionals because their clients have no option
of exit; 4) teachers are discouraged from exercising creative judgment and become
self-despising time servers; 5) the parents lose control over the fate of their child's
education and accept the status of non-responsible observer; 6) children experience
vulnerability upon perceiving the impotence of their parents; 7) group conflict and
simple apathy result from the disenfranchising of parents and children; and 8)
ordinary and low-income families recognize that the same government that fosters
this system takes care to preserve the natural authority of wealthy parents, thereby devastating civic morale. Id. at 39-40.
441. Peter W. Cookson, Redesigning the Financing of American Education to
Raise Productivity: The Case for a Just Voucher, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION AND
EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES 107 (Simon Hakim et
al. eds., 1994).
442. Vallarelli, supra note 194, at 382.
443. Id. at 385-86.
444. Sherry, supra note 214, at 131.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 179 & n.200.
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have controlled the system for more than sixty years, or do parents think that they, given every cent of that money, can better
decide how and where their child will receive an education? Curiously, if the education establishment believes they can do a
better job, they should have no worry because, under those circumstances, every parent currently serviced by the public school
system will redeem their voucher with their neighborhood public
school and the school will receive every penny of the funding it
would receive without the School Choice Proposal. No one fears a
battle they believe they can win. Instead, the education bureau-8
crats fear that if the system adapts, their positions will die."
The change to a competitive market, via the School Choice Proposal, will not dictate the end of education, but the end to wasteful
practices in public education. Monopoly power has granted the
public school system a captive customer, and the education establishment seems intent on keeping that customer imprisoned.
III. PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING THE
SCHOOL CHOICE PROPOSAL
A. Economic
1. Supply / Demand
A voucher will create consumer demand, but the supply of
schools initially will remain the same. Choice means little if each
consumer is practically required to make the same decision. For
example, choice exists in the current system if a parent forgoes
the state expenditure per pupil and pays a private school tuition.
In theory, choice exists, but in practice, choice is unrealistic. As
such, a change in the demand side, without addressing the supply
side will produce little benefit." 9 Presently, only a small portion
of private schools are non-sectarian, especially in the innercity. 40 Providing choice through a voucher, but eliminating the
vast majority of schools from consideration will negate any meaningful impact that would arise from school choice, especially for
the inner-city poor which is the class that stands to benefit most
from a voucher.451 For this reason, religious schools should be
included in any school choice plan.
Merely providing open public school enrollment, an approach

448. FLIEGEL & MAcGuIRE, supra note 83, at 192.

449. Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 173; Pipes, supra note 349, at 27.
450. See generally Hakim et al., supra note 48, at 6. Of the approximately three
million students that receive private education, 2.5 million attend Catholic paro-

chial schools. Id. Moreover, the Catholic school system is virtually the only private
school alternative in the inner-city. See Beers & Ellig, supra note 64, at 29 (noting
emergence of Catholic schools in Chicago, Illinois at the "turn-of-the-century").
451. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 151.
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equivocally supported by the education establishment in the face
of widespread public demands for school choice, is also a solution
of limited potential. 52 Open public schools, without an option to
attend private schools, fail to meaningfully expand consumer
alternatives. Public school choice provides a choice among homogenous providers. With public school choice, the curriculum,
teaching methods and educational practices, nonetheless, generally remain uniform.' Moreover, without the voucher, the public
school system will maintain its monopoly position, perpetuating
the corresponding "deadweight" loss.'
Even with vouchers, parents will face barriers that limit the
supply of schools from which to choose. Geographical barriers
create a practical obstacle, leading parents to generally favor
schools proximate to their home. 4s5 Transportation costs, as well
as the cost of acquiring information, probably will eliminate distant schools from consideration." An increase in the number of
schools providing education likely will occur to meet increased
demand where that increased demand exists - i.e., mostly in the
inner-city. Unnecessary constraints, or a failure to make a longterm commitment to school choice, however, will dampen interest
in establishing private schools to meet the increased demand. For
example, the New Hampshire school choice experiment fixed a
five-year limit on the availability of vouchers. 7 Accordingly, the
finite period increased the enterprise risk associated with building
a school, eliminated investment returns from becoming a private
provider of education, and precluded the entry of entrepreneurs
into the market.4
Means testing vouchers (i.e., only providing to low-income
students) also severely limits the potential of school choice to
improve the overall quality of education. 9 Middle income families would continue to face the double tax burden if they desire to
send their children to private schools. Most would opt for the default provider (i.e., the state) and to a large degree, the public
school monopoly would continue. Because only a limited segment
of the population would receive vouchers, the increase in private
sector supply would be curtailed as well. Moreover, providing

452. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 115.
453. In fact, the Wisconsin Constitution requires uniformity among public
schools in a district. See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 473-74 (Wis. 1992).

454. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text discussing the "deadweight"
societal loss of the public school system.
455. Daniel, supra note 30, at 15-16.
456. Id.
457. Menge, supra note 146, at 174.
458. See id. (discussing the New Hampshire Voucher Program).
459. Bright, supra note 322, at 197 (discussing the Wisconsin school choice plan
which is limited to students from low-income families).
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vouchers to some, but not all, will foster resentment from those
denied state welfare.
Charter schools represent a supply-side stimulus to foster the
development of disparate schools.46 ° Charter schools offer promising results because these operate outside the realm of the public
school system's centralized bureaucracy.46' Charter schools are
therefore directly accountable to consumers, leading to improved
educational quality, innovative curricula and pedagogical methods, involved parents and appropriate incentive systems for
teachers and principals.462 Although charter schools provide a
short-term solution to avoiding the public school monopoly, maintaining a public sector provider retains direct economic dependence on the state, making charter schools inefficient producers in
the long run. Moreover, to be effective, the centralized bureaucracy cannot smother the establishment or operation of charter
schools, which it often tends to do.463 Otherwise, parents and
teachers will lose control, and the charter school will be no different from other public schools.4
Although unleashing demand will lead to the creation of new
supply, indirect supply-side subsidies to encourage the entry of
private sector producers may also be considered. A change in the
conditions of production inputs will lead to a change in the
amount supplied.465 Unquestionably, capital costs constitute a
substantial production input of operating a school. Subsidizing the
capital costs of establishing a private school would expand supply.
Subsidizing capital investment could occur through tax free "Educational Development Bonds" or a capital gains tax exemption on
equity investments into accredited providers of lower-level education. The federal government similarly encourages the construction of housing available to low-income families by subsidizing the interest contractors pay on construction loans.466
2. Price Floors and Price Caps -

Vouchers and Price Inflation

The School Choice Proposal resembles other state voucher
7
plans."w
The scholarship is redeemable at any public or private

460. FLIEGEL & MACGUIRE, supra note 83, at 193.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. See Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Diane Ravitch, CharterSchools - Beware Limitations,WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1995, at C14.
464. See Pipes, supra note 349, at 28.
465. BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 14.
466. See supra notes 371-81 and accompanying text discussing the Low Income
Housing Program.
467. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of the school choice
plan proposed by Delaware Governor Pierre duPont.
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school, thereby forcing all schools to compete for students. The
amount of the voucher is left to the state to determine. The Milwaukee Plan offered $2,500 vouchers, half the amount spent per
pupil in the public school system.4 68 Indiana proposed providing
parents with a voucher equal in amount to state and local funding
allocated per student in the child's school district, thereby eliminating any funding advantage of public schools.469 In 1990, then
governor of Delaware Pierre duPont proposed a $2,150 scholarship, approximately one-third of the $6,650 cost per student in the
public school system, basing the voucher amount on a review of
private school tuition in the state.47 °
The voucher amount must be sufficient to make a meaningful
supply of private schools available. Moreover, setting an amount
substantially higher than the prevailing market rate for private
tuition will encourage new private schools to enter the market
and transform the market into one dominated by private sector
providers more quickly. 471 The voucher amount will initially operate as a price floor, and then, after competitors emerge, as a
price ceiling.472 Presuming a limited number of competitors in
the market, lower cost schools will tend to raise tuition to the
amount of the voucher, causing price inflation. For example, if the
voucher amount is set at $2,150, a school previously charging
tuition of $2,000 likely will raise tuition to $2,150. That school
will realize "excess returns" as a result of the voucher establishing
a higher price than the school otherwise would charge. Normally,
competition enters a market where excess returns are generated
and will "compete away" those rents and establish a competitive
price.4 73 One consequence of setting a high voucher amount,
then, will be to create excess returns in the short term, and attract additional suppliers.4 74
Because most voucher plans require the full use of the voucher, an artificial price floor will emerge at the voucher amount
because a parent incurs no benefit from selecting a school that
offers a tuition lower than the voucher amount. Schools will not
charge below the voucher amount, and excess returns may remain
for low cost schools. Schools, instead, would compete on non-price
terms, similar in principle to commercial banks giving toasters to
depositors when the federal government set maximum interest
rates lower than the market price for deposits.4 75 With schools

468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.

Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 477 (Wis. 1992) (Cecil, J., concurring).
See duPont, supra note 1, at 132-40.
Id.
BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 257-58.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 257-58.
Id.
Prior to 1980, Regulation Q of the Federal Reserve Board restricted the
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supported by public funds, such a result would lead to subsidization of activities that do not result in marginal benefits that taxpayers generally want to finance (e.g., free letter jackets to all
graduates).
To address the potential for creating an inflexible price floor
for lower level education, a voucher plan should rebate to parents
the amount of the voucher that exceeds private tuition. Parents
could keep the difference and spend it however they choose. As a
result, the voucher amount would operate similarly to a price
ceiling in the market for a minimum amount of lower level education.476 Private schools would charge less than the voucher
amount and compete away any excess rents that the voucher
amount may allow. Again, setting a voucher price higher than the
average tuition will stimulate entry.
Some concern may exist that parents will simply choose the
"cheapest" school and pocket the excess. Although similar concerns could be levied against the federal food stamp program,
such fears are misplaced with school choice. Low cost schools
would provide adequate education because these schools would
need to meet state accreditation standards.4 77 Moreover, those
parents undertaking the effort to make a choice of schools certainly can be expected to favor the long term interests of their children rather than short term consumption.4 7 Nonetheless, to resolve the tension between an inflexible price floor and direct cash
rebates, Indiana proposed placing the excess of the voucher in a
lifetime account of the student that could be used for educational
purposes, such as college or vocational education. 479 Although
the Indiana plan introduces additional administrative costs, it
creates an economic incentive for students to graduate and seek
additional education. In addition, the permissible uses of the Indiana account could be expanded to finance other activities such as
job training by employers.
3. Information Costs -

The Risk of "Evil Choices"

The education establishment advances three discernible arguments related to information costs as a market imperfection that
makes school choice unfavorable. First, parents are incapable of
making the "correct" choice of schools for their children and,
therefore, better educated professional bureaucrats must be en-

amount of interest a commercial bank could offer to attract deposits. See TIM S.
CAMPBELL, MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETs 426 (1988).

476.
477.
478.
479.
choice

BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 22, at 257-58.
FLIEGEL & MACGUIRE, supra note 83, at 193.
Id. at 190-92.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the school
plan proposed by Delaware Governor Pierre duPont.
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trusted with the power to assign children to schools.4"' Second,
parents will blindly favor schools in higher socio-economic areas,
unfairly impairing schools in lower income areas.481 Third, as a
result of the bias toward higher income area schools, school choice
will require lower income students to undertake the burden of
travelling to high-income area schools, but children in high-income areas will not need to suffer that burden.482
The first assertion, that parents are incapable of making a
"good" choice, reflects the sickening paternalism of the present
system. 3 The education system should reflect the model of free
choice and self-determination that underlies American society.'
Even after implementing school choice, bureaucratic self-preservation will further the notion that the state must intimately involve
itself in parental choice. 485 New Hampshire's experiment with a
voucher plan included a 228 page manual to describe the "simple"
school choice plan.486 Moreover, the education establishment in
New Hampshire compelled the creation of an Information Agency,
a multi-layered bureaucracy designed to provide information on
education choices.4 8' The New Hampshire approach indicates
that as the state unduly complicates selecting a school, choice
becomes more costly, and thus, fewer choices are made.
Parents are not only capable of making "good" choices without stringent government oversight, but parents, rather than
bureaucrats, should decide where their child will attend school.
The Economics of Information (EOI) ensures that a market of
information concerning product attributes will emerge.4 8
Schools will advertise their curriculums, test scores, college placement and specialized programs.4 9 Typically, third parties provide independent evaluations of academic programs.490 Moreover, schools will develop reputations, both good and bad, which
will assist parents in making their choice. The premise that poor

480. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 11, at 146.
481. Id. at 145.
482. Patricia L. Willis, A Business Person's Perspective:Anti-Choice, in PROCEEDINGS: THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY/URBAN SCHOOLS NATIONAL TASK FORCE: SCHOOL CHOICE 58 (Richard M. Bossone and Irwin H. Polishook
eds., 1992).
483. FLIEGEL & MAcGUIRE, supra note 83, at 186-87.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 192.
486. Menge, supra note 146, at 174.
487. Id.
488. See generally John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some
Lessons from the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245 (1994); George J.
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
489. Id.
490. See, e.g., America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 363, at 84 (describing
the annual rankings of graduate schools in U.S. News & World Report).
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parents cannot effectively choose a school after evaluating available information is patronizing and contradicts the experience
with school choice in East Harlem, New York.4 9' According to
the leaders of the charter school initiative in East Harlem, "when
poor parents were provided with information, they fought as hard,
if not harder, to educate themselves and their children as to their
options and how to realize them within a choice system."4 92
School choice opponents nonetheless worry that children will
be harmed by making a "bad" choice, or harmed when denied the
school of their first choice.493 For this reason, school choice is to
be forsaken. Inevitably, parents may choose a school that, after
enrolling, the child realizes is inappropriate for him or her. The
child, however, can transfer schools the following year. Concededly, transferring may cause some disruption, but arguably is no
more injurious than the experiences of children in assigned
schools who have no escape. For children who are denied their
first school of choice, the option of transferring will be a desirable
means to attend a "better" school after proving themselves at
another school.494
The second argument, that parents will blindly favor schools
in high income areas thus leading to the demise of schools in low
income areas, is demonstrably false.495 Parents will naturally
tend to favor neighborhood schools due to the inconveniences of
transportation. 496 Competition for inner-city students will improve the quality of all inner-city schools. 497 A choice system is
not designed, nor will it lead to, a strict stratification of quality.
Instead, choice will lead to a wide array of high quality schools.
An example of a high quality inner-city school that attracts
wealthy suburban children exists in Chicago with St. Ignatius
College Preparatory.4 95 Moreover, Chicago aptly illustrates a vibrant market of affordable private education in the inner-city. 499
The third argument against school choice follows the same
paternalistic pattern of the first. This argument says that even if
you want to do it, we must save you from yourself. 00 Polly Williams, a leading advocate of the school choice plan in Milwaukee,

491.

supra note 83, at 189-90.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 483 and accompanying text for a discussion of parents' preffor sending their children to school in higher socio-economic areas.
496. FLIEGEL & MACGUIRE, supra note 83, at 189.
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reflects her sentiment toward such paternalism by haranguing the
establishment with, "if liberals in the [Democratic] party are so
good for black people, why are we in such bad shape?" °1 The
underlying premise of school choice is that the parent and child,
not the state, will decide which school to attend.0 2 If the child
values the incremental benefit of a better education more than the
incremental cost of inconvenience arising from travelling to another school, then the child will choose the distant school.50 3 The
question with school choice ultimately becomes who decides, the
parent or the state. For a bureaucrat to usurp that choice emasculates any notion of liberty that underlies our society. Furthermore,
to mask such an argument under the guise of "equity" is the "last
refuge of the scoundrel." 0 4 According to the innovators of the
East Harlem choice plan, "equity is a great idea, and we are all in
favor of it, but let's concentrate less on equities that level down
and more on equities that level up."50 5
The education establishment attempts to clothe their opposition to school choice as coming from the guardians of the poor.50 '
The class warfare tactic is sadly more concerned with the "haves"
not having rather than the "have nots" having. The education establishment has dictated the operation of a public education monopoly that has decimated the opportunities for the class of people
they see themselves as protecting. Whether merely good-intentioned but wrong, or disingenuous and self-interested is irrelevant. The contention that parents cannot choose, or if they do
choose it will be inequitable, really boils down to education bureaucrats self-interestedly preserving their jobs.
B. Legal
1. Establishment Clause
Including religious schools in the School Choice Proposal
raises an obvious Establishment Clause issue. 0 ' School choice
proposals have a tendency to exclude religious schools to avoid the
inevitable constitutional challenge. 0 ' Timid political pragma-

501. Id.
502. Daniel, supra note 30, at 8.
503. FLIEGEL & MACGUIRE, supra note 83, at 190-91.
504. Id. at 188.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 186-88.
507. The Establishment Clause in the First Amendment states that "Congress
U.S. CONST.
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...
amend. I.

508. See generally Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of Sectarian Education: Establishment and Free Exercise Clause Implications, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 7
(1993).
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tism may prove unwise, however. Excluding religious schools
eliminates the vast majority of private schools from consider-

ation. °9 The full benefits of a competitive market will not materialize, and the education establishment will soon proclaim, "we
tried school choice and it did not work," when, in actuality, true
school choice was never "tried" at all. So far, stalling the inevitable constitutional question has allowed law reviews to fill their
pages with the on-going debate of whether the Establishment
Clause precludes enacting a voucher system that includes parochial schools.51 ° As with many constitutional issues, the conclusion
on the constitutional question generally coincides with the conclusion on the underlying policy. As such, those favoring school
choice fail to identify an Establishment Clause problem, whereas
those who oppose school choice find that the Constitution provides
a convenient backstop to prevent such a plan. This Article concededly follows that pattern.
The three-prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman5 ' provides the
point of departure to determine whether the School Choice Proposal would violate the Establishment Clause. Under Lemon, a
statute must have a secular purpose; the principal or primary
effect of the statute must neither inhibit nor advance religion; and
the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement
with religion.5 1 2 The secular purpose prong generally has little
relevance in an Establishment Clause inquiry into aid to parochial schools.513
The inquiry concerning the primary effect of a legislative
scheme tends to distinguish between whether state aid travels
directly from the state to the school, 14 or takes an indirect route
from the state to the individual to the school." 5 In Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,5 16 the Court

invalidated a New York law that, in part, provided direct mone-

509. Stick, supra note 183, at 430.
510. See e.g., Bright, supra note 322, at 193; David Futterman, School Choice
and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of Public Aid to Private Parochial
Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711 (1993); Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against
Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 37 (1993); Note, The Establishment
Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education, 91 YALE L.J. 1196
(1982).

511. 403 U.S. 602, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
512. Id. at 612-13.
513. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
514. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764
(1973). But see Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (permitting direct state aid to religious colleges if the institution is not pervasively sectarian and secular activities can be separated).
515. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388; Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 485 (1986).
516. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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tary grants to particular religious schools for maintenance. Yet, in
Mueller v. Allen," 7 the Court upheld Minnesota's state tax deduction for education expenses incurred by parents providing
tuition, textbooks and transportation for their children to attend
elementary or secondary school, either public or private. Although
the deduction overwhelmingly benefitted parents who sent their
children to religious schools, the Court stated that, contrary to
Nyquist where the state provided tuition grants only to parents
who sent children to private schools, the state aid was "made
available generally [to all parents of the State] without regard to
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature.""' As such,
similar to Equal Protection analysis, a mere discriminatory effect
does not per se violate the Establishment Clause." 9
The Court reinforced its position toward permitting indirect
assistance (i.e., aid that first goes to a citizen before going to a
religious institution) in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind.5 2 ° In Witters, the Court upheld that a state
could extend assistance to blind persons who intended to become
ministers or study at Christian colleges.5 2 ' Accordingly, when
"aid goes to individuals, [that] means that [the] decision to support religious education is made by the individual, not by the
State."522 Most recently, the Court held in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District 23 that the Establishment Clause does
not prevent a public school district from providing a sign-language
interpreter to a hearing-impaired child who chose to attend a
sectarian school.
The standard voucher redeemable at a religious school withstands scrutiny under Lemon's second prong. As with the aid in
Witters, a voucher provides indirect aid to religious schools only
after a parent chooses to enroll their child in a religious
school. 24 When aid is indirect, the primary effect is to advance
the direct activity, which is education in the case of vouchers. Although the School Choice Proposal affects a broader class of persons and may differ in scope than the aid in Witters, the scope
does not differ in degree, or principle, from the tax deductions in

517. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
518. Id. at 398.
519. Id. at 400-01; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976).
520. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). But see Witters v. Washington Comm'n for the Blind,
771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (stating that financial aid for religious education is unconstitutional under the Washington state constitution), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 850 (1989).
521. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
522. Id. at 488.
523. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
524. Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-87.
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Mueller.2 ' A tax deduction and voucher have equivalent economic effects because both rebate to the taxpayer funds to which
the state otherwise would be entitled. Of course, instead of a
voucher, school choice could be achieved by raising the deduction
to a level that eliminates the "double tax."5 26 That alternative,
however, ignores that inner-city families do not have the income
to shield with a tax deduction.527 The voucher merely provides
the same economic benefit to poor families that the Establishment
Clause permits with tax deductions for rich families.
Other religious schools benefit from large-scale indirect state
assistance programs, yet survive Lemon's second prong. The federal student loan program, essentially a form of demand-side subsidy for college education, places no restriction on students attending religious schools.52 Moreover, the G.I. Bill operates similarly by financing the education, even at religious colleges, of eligible
persons.529 Although the Court may more strictly review programs that affect children due to a fear of "indoctrination," that
distinction generally applies when religious symbols are involuntarily thrust on students in a public school.53 ° Here, the parent
breaks the indoctrination causal chain by making a voluntary
choice of schools.
Next, for the School Choice Proposal to run afoul of Lemon's
excessive entanglement prong, the voucher must lead to "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" of
religious schools."' Opponents of the voucher pretend that the
state has no present involvement with religious schools, and that
the voucher will suddenly lead to substantial state oversight.
Thus, the School Choice Proposal presumably fails Lemon's third
prong. Yet, states already heavily involve themselves with accreditation, reviewing textbooks, monitoring attendance and scoring
532
state required tests taken by students of religious schools.
Therefore, a challenge under this prong must show that the incremental involvement of the state will amount to "comprehen-

525. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390-93.
526. See supra note 93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "double
tax" incurred by parents with children in private schools who must pay tuition for
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527. Daniel, supra note 30, at 23-24.
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529. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 3451 et seq. (West 1990); Witters, 474 U.S. at 388 n.3.
530. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (prohibiting school prayer
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surveillance."533 As currently structured, the School
Choice Proposal will not meaningfully alter a state's involvement
with religious schools. The third prong represents a mere red-herring raised by school choice opponents.
The concern of legislators regarding the constitutionality of
including religious schools appears to be misplaced. Vouchers
advance education, not religion. The Court's modern approach to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence recognizes that

sive ...

At this point in the 20th century, we are quite far removed from the
dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment
Clause in the Bill of Rights. [citations omitted]. The risk of significant religious or denominational control over our democratic processes - or even of deep political division along religious lines - is
remote when viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian
schools, and such risk seems 3entirely
tolerable in light of the contin4
uing oversight of this Court.
A wholesale assertion that any voucher plan including religious schools violates the Establishment Clause is clearly wrong.
A school choice plan, properly crafted, can include religious
schools and pass federal constitutional muster.535 Most important, the School Choice Proposal should be made available to all
parents, and envision no greater oversight of religious schools. As
such, state legislators grappling with school choice should proceed
to include religious schools in that plan. However, one caveat
exists. State constitutions may require a stricter separation of
church and state than the federal standard under the Establishment Clause.53 If so, those states may need to amend their
state constitutions to include religious schools.
2. Equal Protection
Prior to the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board
of Education,3 7 many school districts provided public education
in segregated schools. In Brown, a unanimous Court held that a
legal scheme mandating segregating schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 In the follow-up case to determine the appropriate remedy, the Court or-
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536. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices (Choice in Education), 616 A.2d 478, 480
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attend religious school is unconstitutional under Washington state constitution).
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dered that the school district abandon a scheme of segregation
and proceed with "all deliberate speed" to desegregate its
schools.539 The Court authorized district courts to oversee school
desegregation orders that local school boards would need to devise
in order to comply with Brown.54 ° Forty years later, after intense federal supervision of local school systems, large numbers of
inner-city children nonetheless attend one-race schools.54'
A literal reading of Brown suggests that the Supreme Court
merely decided that de jure segregation in public education violates Equal Protection. 4 2 A literal reading ignores the progeny
of school desegregation cases that indicate a federal mandate to
end desegregation and the vestiges of racial discrimination.543
The cases immediately following Brown focused on the conversion
from a dual system, one for blacks and one for whites, to a unitary system. In Green v. County School Board,'" the Court in-

validated a freedom-of-choice plan that a school board proffered to
remedy its separate system. Such a plan, however, would be constitutional if the plan offered a "real promise of aiding a desegregation program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual
system to a unitary, non-racial system.""
54
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,

the Court provided greater flexibility to school boards in devising
alternative schemes to comply with Brown. Student assignments
were acceptable so long as the school district did not exclude students, directly or indirectly, on account of race.54 The Court further recognized that one-race schools within a school district were
inevitable due to large concentrations of blacks in inner-cities, and
thus not per se unconstitutional.5 The judicial oversight that
Brown II required was intended to be temporary.549 Once a
school district has complied with a desegregation order and at one
time achieved "unitary status," judicial intervention under Brown
H is inappropriate.550 Instead, intervention should occur only according to the more general standards of Equal Protection. 5 '
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The Court affirmed this principle in Freeman v. Pitts by denying
an Equal Protection claim when resegregation of a school district
resulted from private choices, rather than state action.552
Despite Green, a school choice plan seemingly would survive
an Equal Protection challenge. If the school district implementing
the School Choice Proposal had achieved "unitary status," Dowell
suggests that further judicial intervention and desegregation
orders cannot proceed unless the Proposal has the actual intent to
discriminate according to race.553 Furthermore, Freeman would
immunize the School Choice Proposal from attack even if such a
plan resulted in a greater number of one-race public schools.554
For school districts still subject to a desegregation order, Green
expressly recognizes that a school choice plan may be utilized.55
Although the freedom of choice plan in Green did not pass the
Court's scrutiny, the school district had not attempted to use
other methods to achieve desegregation. 56 Conversely, the
School Choice Proposal would constitute an alternative means to
accomplish desegregation only after other methods had failed.
Recent cases explicitly suggest the Court's willingness to defer to
"experimentation" by local school boards in their efforts to achieve
desegregation. 57 So long as opportunities exist for desegregated
education, the School Choice plan will be permissible.
Merely because the School Choice Proposal and Brown can
constitutionally coexist does not address the normative concern
underlying the policy of desegregation. Yet, the School Choice
Proposal offers a realistic mechanism to desegregate education on
a broader scale. Blacks and minorities constitute a disproportionate segment of the poor. Thus, they will disproportionately benefit
from a scheme that enables them to bypass the public school system that created, and continues to foster, segregation.5 8 Concededly, the underlying goal of the School Choice Proposal does
not directly target eradicating desegregation. In fact, in present
choice systems, a niche of Afro-centric schools have emerged to
appeal exclusively to black children (i.e., presumably adopting the
premise of "separate, but better").5 9 The School Choice Proposal, however, will more effectively and efficiently create meaningful
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opportunities for desegregated education than federal court monitoring.
Accomplishing desegregation by school choice was attempted
by an offspring plaintiff class from the Jenkins v. Missouri" ° desegregation case. In that case, the class sought a judicial remedy
of tuition vouchers to attend any of fifty private schools within the
Kansas City School District.56 ' That remedy would assist the
district in meeting numerical targets for racial balance by allowing black children to leave the public school system, thereby increasing the proportion of whites in the district.562 The School
Choice Proposal more broadly would allow all children to leave
the system, expanding the universe of schools offering desegregated education. Although the initial effects on desegregation
would be marginal, the long-term prospect for desegregating not
merely the public schools, but all schools within a community,
seems bright.
Desegregation efforts under the Brown mandate have provided perverse results, analogous to attempting to make water flow
uphill. The Boston public school system reflects the problem of
"white flight" when students, through busing and conscripted
attendance, are coerced into a school system to meet a numerical
racial mix.563 The Kansas City school system, the subject of the
Jenkins litigation, attempted to draw whites into a predominantly
black school district by spending $500 million on new magnet
schools.56' For their money, Kansas City "bought" 750 white students into the district, less than three percent of the student population.56 5 Tragically, 3,000 black students remained on a
waiting list to attend the lavish, albeit half-empty, schools until
more whites could be lured into the district.566 Contrast a school
choice plan in East Harlem that began in 1974.567 The district
allowed the development of alternative schools (similar to charter
schools) that could independently develop curriculums outside the
influence of the school board.566 Parents could send their child to
any school in the district. 569 In seven years, East Harlem raised
its district rating from thirty-two to eighteen. 7 0 Additionally,
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twenty-five times the number of students were admitted to selective high schools than when the program began.571 With respect
to desegregation, the student population continues to mostly represent the predominantly black and hispanic racial mix of the district.5 7 2 However, the district did attract573 several hundred white
students from outside the school district.
3. State Law Issues
a. Educational Equity
The latest fad in education litigation has been challenging
the public education system under state constitutional provisions
that typically provide a right to education.57 4 Plaintiffs, students
and taxpayers in poor school districts, generally contend that the
public education system discriminates against them and provides
an unconstitutionally unequal education relative to rich school
districts.575 Plaintiffs seek to declare the public education system unconstitutional, and issue a mandate to the legislature to
remedy the funding disparities among school districts.7 6 Initially, plaintiffs availed themselves of the federal Equal Protection
Clause to challenge their state public education systems. 57 Yet,
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez5 7 ' the
Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right,
wealth is not a suspect class and, thus, as so often the case under
"rational basis" review, the plaintiff lost.
Denied a federal remedy, plaintiffs then asserted claims under their respective state constitutions. In Robinson v. Cahill,579
the New Jersey Supreme Court resuscitated the "educational
equity" claim brought under a state constitutional right to education. Robinson established the norm for educational equity claims,
and from the time of its decision in 1973, sixteen state supreme
courts have intervened and held their public education systems
unconstitutional.8 0
The merits of activist judicial intervention in an area historically belonging to state legislatures presents its own set of problems. Judicial solutions to policy matters are less "democratic,"
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especially in states that do not elect their judges. 58' Judges not
accountable to voters have deeply entangled themselves with the
"nuts and bolts of education policy"" 2 mandated compliance
with unpopular solutions. Conversely, judicial action is attractive
for its efficiency, and overreaching courts have been, to some extent, brushed back by ballot initiatives.5 83
Educational equity litigation raises a more troubling question, however, concerning its effectiveness in improving education
quality. The litigation is expensive, diverts funds from schools to
lawyers and victory in the courts seldom lead to substantive
changes in the legislative scheme.5" For example, the New Jersey litigation continues, while rich school districts spend $1,700
more per pupil than poor districts.8 5 California solved its funding disparities by spending less on overall education. 8 8 Yet,
probably most disturbing is the underlying premise of the educational equity claim that: increased expenditure in the current
public education
system will lead to improved academic perfor587
mance.
In the present system, no systematic relationship exists between school expenditures and student performance. 8 8 Aggregate school expenditures per pupil have doubled from 1966 to
1989, while average S.A.T. scores have declined by more than
sixty points.58 9 Although some question the merits of measuring
performance with S.A.T. scores, similar declines are reflected in
other standardized tests and in comparative tests with students of
other countries.59 ° Some argue that the increase in expenditure
relates to increased tasks externally imposed on public educators,
i.e., educating handicapped students, immigrants and other disadvantaged students.5 91 Yet, the bulk of the increase is attributable to implementing policies independently established by the
public education system purportedly designed to improve student
performance.5 92 For example, increasing salaries for teachers
holding master's or other higher level degrees, rewarding teacher
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seniority without accounting for teacher performance and reducing student/teacher ratios.59 3
Increased expenditure has not enhanced student performance. The bureaucratic structure of the public education system
readily explains such a result. For every U.S. dollar the school
system receives, only sixty-six cents is applied to "instructional
expenditures."5 94 The remainder is directed toward bureaucracy.5 95 Further analysis indicates that a substantial portion of
"instructional expenditures" provide no countervailing benefit in
terms of student performance.596 Instructional expenditures are
mostly determined by teacher salaries and class size.5 97 Teacher
salaries are determined according to seniority and education received, rather than merit.5 9 Professor Hanushek accumulated
the results of more than 187 studies that sought to determine if
any relationship existed between class size, teacher experience,
and teacher education.9 9 Hanushek concluded that, "o]verall,
the results are startlingly consistent. No compelling evidence
emerges that teacher/student ratios, teacher education or teacher
experience have the expected positive effects on student performance.' °
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The conclusions require appropriate caution. These studies do
not refute the intuitive notion that increased spending should lead
to increased performance. Instead, these studies indicate that increased expenditure in the present system does not lead to increased student performance because the present system inefficiently employs its resources.6"' The studies reflect that the
present system's investment in teacher experience, smaller class
size and teacher education do not provide a return on investment
in student performance. The results perfectly illustrate producer
advantage in a monopoly market. As a result, the premise of the
educational equity claim, to improve education in poor school
districts by increasing expenditure, dictates that this policy approach will fail if the goal is to improve student performance. If
the goal is to maximize producer welfare, or merely government
provision regardless of social cost, then the educational equity
claim succeeds.
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b. Davis v. Grover:60 2 State Constitutional Attacks Against
School Choice
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) established
a landmark foray into the realm of widespread school choice.6" 3
The MPCP is an experiment that tests the underlying premise
that parental choice leads to an improvement in education for
children of low-income families. Wisconsin enacted the MPCP to
provide that certain low-income students in Milwaukee may attend, at no charge, any nonsectarian private school located in the
Milwaukee School District. 60 4 No more than one percent, or
1,000, of the students in the district may participate per school
year.6005 Approximately $2,500 of state educational funding is diverted to the private school attended by each participating student.0 6 In 1990, the first year of implementation, 341 students
participated. Presently, approximately 830 students participate. 07
Acting predictably, like any state-sanctioned monopolist faced
with competition, State Superintendent Herbert Grover set forth
to create impenetrable barriers to entry for private schools seeking to participate.6 08 Grover attempted to require private schools
to execute "complex forms certifying that they [the private
schools] met numerous requirements in excess of those specified
[by the statute]."6 °9 Lonzetta Davis, the parent of a six-year-old
student seeking to participate in the program, initiated an action
asserting that the Superintendent exceeded his authority and
acted to frustrate the MPCP. 1° Various school administration
organizations and the NAACP intervened ("Intervenors") to challenge the MPCP under the Wisconsin Constitution. The Intervenors alleged that the MPCP was unconstitutionally "logrolled"
through the legislature as part of a budget bill, that the MPCP
violated the uniform district schools clause and that the MPCP
impermissibly dedicated public funds to a private purpose.6 1 1 A
Wisconsin circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the MPCP
and determined that Superintendent Grover exceeded his authori-
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ty.112 A court of appeals reversed, finding that the MPCP was
unconstitutional on the "logrolling" allegation, but did not enjoin
the MPCP. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the MPCP,
dismissing the Intervenors's three allegations.613 The procedural
claim of logrolling, although the principal issue dividing the Wisconsin Supreme Court, probably does not universally threaten
state school choice plans properly enacted. The two other substantive claims, however, may potentially impact other state school
choice plans.
The Wisconsin Constitution provides that "the legislature
shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools
which shall be as nearly uniform as possible."6" The Intervenors argued that participating private schools became district
schools by accepting public money. Accordingly, these private
schools, by offering a different (read: better)" 5 "character of instruction" from the public schools in the district, allegedly violated
the Uniformity Clause. The court determined that participating
private schools do not constitute district schools, reasoning that
the Uniformity Clause requires the legislature to provide the
opportunity for children to receive a free uniform basic education,
but does not require the legislature to ensure that all children
must receive a uniform education." 6 The court's reasoning
makes sense, otherwise construing the Uniformity Clause to require that children must receive a uniform education would preclude the mere existence of non-public schools. Moreover, a committed textualist certainly would not construe a private school to
be "established" by the MPCP.
The Intervenors made a "woefully" ironic third claim: that
the MPCP directs public money to private schools that are "woe17
fully inadequate" due to lack of governmental supervision.
The court first noted that the participating private schools must
meet state accreditation and licensing requirements.1 5 The second contention of the Intervenors, however, reflects a tension
particularly germane to other states that adopt school choice
plans. The Intervenors argued that participating private schools
have no duty to demonstrate institutional quality. The absence of
state controls over private schools, therefore, would make diverting state funds inappropriate. However, the underlying
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premise of the MPCP and school choice is that "less bureaucracy
coupled with parental choice [rather than bureaucratic, therefore
would] improve educational quality."619
The Wisconsin court appropriately resolved the tension by
noting that the MPCP provided for state supervision without unduly bureaucratizing the process. Rather than placing direct controls on the participating schools in the form of curriculum content or pedagogical methods, the MPCP adopted an outcome based
review of the overall performance of the schools. As such, the
state can restrict participation to only schools that to meet minimum performance levels, but the state cannot invidiously undermine school choice programs by smothering schools and parents
with excessive regulation.
c. Epilogue: A Preliminary Review of the Milwaukee School
Choice Plan
The MPCP enabling legislation instructed the State Superintendent of Schools to monitor the performance of the participating
students and to oversee that the participating private schools met
the performance criteria that the legislation specifically described.62 ° Pursuant to that statutory responsibility, the State
Department of Public Instruction appointed Professor John Witte
of the University of Wisconsin at Madison to independently evaluate the program.62 '
Witte's conclusions largely were equivocal, and particularly
emphasized that:
[I]t is not only too soon to make any definite judgments about
achievement, but that making any judgment at all would be difficult [because] [ailmost all students in the program are elementary
or middle school students. It is extremely difficult to measure outcomes or achievement for children at those ages.622
In general, Witte reported that compared to Milwaukee public
school students, choice students' achievement test scores were
slightly higher on reading, and slightly lower on math.62' Harvard University Professor Paul E. Peterson sharply criticized
Witte's comparison methodology, claiming that the choice students
were compared to a control group with higher initial test scores,
higher incomes and more intact families. 624 To that end, Witte's
report does concede that the choice students were not succeeding
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in the public schools, that they probably had higher-than-average
behavioral problems and that seventy-six percent came from single-parent homes.625

Witte's report concluded that parental satisfaction with the
schools of choice was significantly higher than that with the public schools in all categories surveyed (e.g., teachers, principal,
instruction and discipline).62 s High parental satisfaction led to

higher involvement in the school and its various parental organizations. Similarly, student satisfaction was positive. Although a

student attrition rate of thirty-five percent occurred between the
first and second year, that was mostly attributed to a thirty-three

percent mobility rate of students in the Milwaukee public schools
and the closing of a private academy in the district. In addition,
uncertainty that the school choice program would survive the

numerous lawsuits filed by various education organizations also
led to attrition.
Most important, school choice brought promise to low-income
youths that the public schools could not deliver. Doris Pinkney, a

parent of a participating child, described her situation as follows:
'[T]he Milwaukee Public Schools just lost interest in [my child].'
With the help of the Milwaukee School Choice Plan, she was able to
place Tanika [her child] in the fourth grade class at Hararnbe
School, 'where she's having the best education experience of her life.
She loves school, is learning a lot, and is on the honor roll. Moving
her to a private school may be the best decision we ever made. 27
Opinion polls of Wisconsin residents reflect greater support
628
for a voucher system now, than at the inception of the MPCP.
Moreover, a new superintendent, Howard Fuller, replaced Herbert
Grover, the official who attempted to derail school choice at every
point. Superintendent Fuller addressed the Milwaukee School
Board in an eight-page memo that, inter alia, recommended increasing parental involvement in choice programs, informing parents of their opportunity to select a private school of choice and
allowing dollars to follow the student instead of the institution.
IV.

OUTLOOK -

WHERE IS SCHOOL CHOICE TODAY?

School choice exists in varying degrees in several states.
Minnesota enacted open public school enrollment in 1987, and today, twenty-one states have adopted some form of public school
choice. 62 9 Likewise, twenty-seven states have adopted the char-
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ter school movement in one form or another.63 Yet, the first
state to adopt a voucher plan, and the state that appears to lead
the rest in establishing meaningful school choice is Wisconsin.
Governor Tommy Thompson, quickly becoming a national political
leader as a result of his progressive views on school choice, has
proposed expanding the coverage of the Milwaukee voucher program to a greater number of students, and to include religious
schools as eligible institutions. 631' The plan has received bi-partisan support, notably the advocacy of Democrat state legislator
Polly Williams and Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist" 2 Other
states, namely Ohio, are also forging aggressive voucher plans as
well.63
Although education organizations in 1993 successfully defeated several state-wide referenda on school choice, the 1994 elections brought pro-choice majorities to several state legislatures
and governor's mansions despite the opposition from education
groups.6" Eight states will actively consider establishing, or expanding, voucher programs in 1995.635 Wisconsin and Ohio plan
to include religious schools in their programs, presenting the Establishment Clause issue for the first time.
Each program presently under consideration, however, is
limited in scope, and designed more as an "experiment" than a
true commitment to school choice. For example, no state plans to
consider a universal voucher program available to all students in
the state. Instead, all target their programs to low-income students, and typically only to those in the school districts of large
metropolitan areas. Programs of limited reach unfortunately will
yield only limited benefits. No measurable expansion in the supply of schools will occur without greater certainty of long-term
demand, via the voucher. Moreover, uncertainty concerning the
longevity of the voucher program may inhibit parents from participating. Unfortunately, such timidity may be politically necessary
in light of the education establishment's stranglehold on main-
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taining its monopoly. Sometimes, to get from A to C, you need to
stop at B. Eventually, the impact of school choice on low-income
students will resonate, and middle-income families will likely
organize and demand inclusion in the voucher program as well.

